<HDA>A Development Impasse

Since the Second World War, concepts of ‘development’ have been used to describe and explain social and cultural differences on a global scale (Cooper and Packard 1997b; Mosse 2005). In the postcolonial world that began to emerge in the 1950s and 1960s, ideas of ‘progress’ with roots in earlier colonial and enlightenment thinking were reinvigorated. Embraced by Western leaders as well as by leaders of the newly emerging independent nations, development provided a utopian vision of a postcolonial future in which all could aspire to the socioeconomic conditions experienced in the West. These ideas provided the rationale for the creation of both the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) and the various United Nations agencies. In different ways, these and an expanding number of nongovernmental and multilateral organizations continue to pursue a broadly ‘developmental’ vision. Whilst the statist, technocratic and top-down ideologies that emerged in the 1950s and 1960s have subsequently been heavily criticized, neoliberal thinking predominant within development organizations over the last three decades remains wedded to the overarching goal of linear economic and social ‘progress’.

Against these developmental visions, anthropologists have been central to the emergence of the ‘postdevelopment’ critique (Cooper and Packard 1997a; Crush 1995; Sachs 1992). Arising from and feeding into a wider postmodern questioning of the superiority of Western forms of knowledge (Asad 2003; Fabian 1983), this has brought to light the often negative impacts of an

Comment [SV1]: Please hyphenate post-colonial and post-development.

Comment [SV2]: Please add footnote as follows: A key argument of this book is that it is unhelpful to understand development as a form of ‘western’ knowledge, constituted, as it is, through highly heterogeneous practices and relations that render the category analytically meaningless. We use the terms ‘West’ and ‘Western’, in a purely descriptive sense when referring to broader debates in which the terms have featured. Specifically, these terms are used to refer to a mode of thinking and operating that posits that planned intervention in line with certain ‘universal’ values is both possible and desirable.
ostensibly progressive developmentalist impulse. In particular the above critiques reveal how an overtly benign impulse to eradicate poverty and promote positive social change often ends up reinscribing the very forms of inequality ‘development’ purports to overcome. Thus it has been suggested that in their discursive construction of ideas of ‘poverty’, development institutions objectify an un-differentiated and passive ‘third world’, whose problems are erroneously attributed to the actions of the people living there. In this way development institutions justify their own activities by locating the ‘solutions’ in the supposedly superior forms of ‘expertise’ that Western development professionals bring (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Hobart 1993a; Long and Long 1992).

Although this postdevelopment critique has pertinently highlighted how apparently ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’ developmental discourses often end up justifying political inequality, it has led to an increasingly acute impasse. In their wholesale rejection of ‘development’, these critiques have tended to foreclose consideration of how or whether it is possible to retain hope in the vision of a better or more just future (Porter 1995). Even in challenging the universal applicability of development knowledge and expertise, there has been a tendency to universalize the practices and processes through which development projects and programmes practically unfold. In particular, a prevailing concern with development as a form of ‘discourse’ leads to forms of analysis and description that ignore the particular ideas, relations and practices through which ideas of development are practically enacted (Friedman 2006; Li Murray 2007; Mosse 2005; Olivier de Sardan 2005). From this perspective a stark choice emerges between a disenchanted, rational ‘development machine’ (Ferguson 1994) and an equally dystopian future in which ideas of justice and democracy are abandoned.
This book attempts to move beyond this impasse, selectively building on the critical insights of the postdevelopment critique whilst breaking with its predominantly discursive focus. By taking a more ethnographic approach, contributors aim to re-perceive and hence reorient development practice as a potentially positive force for good. They do so by redirecting attention to the concrete practices through which development is enacted, and the specific social realities that ideas of development frame. In this vein, the book focuses on development as a mode of engagement that, like anthropology, attempts to understand, represent and work within a complex world. In doing so, it aims to pave the way for more reflexive and more ethnographically nuanced understandings of development.

**<HDA>Critical Framings**

With the shift in the late 1980s and early 1990s from more applied forms of ‘development anthropology’ to a more detached ‘anthropology of development’, the relationship between anthropology and development was fundamentally redefined. Where previously anthropologists had largely confined themselves to studying the processes, relationships and dynamics by which development (or, inversely, underdevelopment) was to be understood, increasingly they were turning their attention to the very institutions and knowledge through which ideas of development were produced. From a self-evident if complex social and economic process, ‘development’ was increasingly apprehended as a Western ‘invention’ and the means by which its supposed superiority was tautologically reproduced. Arguably the very field of an ‘anthropology of development’ was founded on belief in the notion of critical deconstruction as a means of uncovering that ‘myth’.
In different ways, Ferguson (1994) and Escobar (1995) made highly influential contributions in opening up this critical space. For both, this entailed moving from the kinds of narrow critiques that anthropologists had been making of particular development policies (normally from the perspective of applied studies of particular groups of people), to a wider critique of ‘development’ as a set of institutionally embedded processes. Rather than challenge particular projects or paradigms in the name of ‘more’ or ‘better’ development, the goal became the critical deconstruction of ‘development’ as such. Critics (anthropological and otherwise) advocating ‘alternative’ forms of development were thus chastised for a failure to sufficiently question the apparatus that was ‘doing’ the development.

This critique was hugely significant in bringing to light the mechanisms by which the industrialized ‘West’ has continued to exercise control over processes of global change in a postcolonial world. In particular, post-development scholars revealed how ostensibly neutral technocratic and market-based discourses have acted to depoliticize and hence justify the often partisan interventions of economically powerful states (e.g., Cooper and Packard 1997b; Ferguson 1994; Sachs 1992). In a related way, various post-development scholars have shown how development organizations define ‘problems’ in ways that justify their own forms of ‘expertise’ and thereby marginalize the insights and understandings of other groups of people (Apthorpe 1997; Escobar 1995; Fairhead and Leach 1997; Grillo and Stirrat 1997). Another strand of this critique reveals how development resources are often used to bolster the position of educated elites, who exploit their politically and socially privileged positions to the detriment of the poor they are supposed to help (e.g., Ferguson 1994).

From the start, the subject and object of this critique was somewhat ambiguous. As early anthropologists of development were quick to acknowledge, any critique of development was
also necessarily a critique of anthropology (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1994; Hobart 1993a).
Anthropological knowledge has been used as a means of practically facilitating particular
colonial and post-colonial attempts to enact social ‘improvement’ (Gardner and Lewis 1996).
Moreover, both anthropologists and development practitioners have shared similar
understandings about the evolution of societies. Thus for Escobar (1995), critique was seen as
the means by which anthropologists could shed light on the practices and assumptions that both
anthropology and development shared. In other words, liberating anthropology from its own
colonial past was inextricably linked to the liberation of anthropology from the space mapped by
the ‘development encounter’.

Nonetheless, it is hard to escape the conclusion that in practice anthropological critiques
of development have been underpinned by an asymmetry. In general, anthropologists have
commented ‘on’ development from a position of superiority that has tended to be assumed rather
than elucidated. Anthropological critiques have largely taken shape on the basis of ethnographic
expertise. This has meant that anthropologists have tended to align themselves with the particular
groups they study, and by extension a generalized non-Western ‘other’. On this basis, knowledge
of particular groups of people has been used as a means of highlighting the shortcomings of
particular development projects and the limitations of ‘development’ practice more generally. In
the stark terms in which Hobart (1993b) puts it, anthropology’s knowledge of the complexities of
particular social and cultural realities thus becomes the means of criticizing development’s
‘ignorance’ of these facts. As Green (2003) has recently argued, anthropologists have therefore
largely imagined themselves outside of and untainted by the development sector. Anthropology’s
increasing sense of itself as a discipline that has moved beyond its colonial past, has taken shape
by reference to development’s apparent inability to make the parallel move.
Yet if anthropological critiques have thus assumed superior empirical knowledge, anthropologists have also criticized development on the basis of greater theoretical sophistication. In this vein, various theoretical insights have been seen as the basis upon which anthropologists are able to see more about the world of development than are the various people who occupy that world. The early emphasis by Escobar and Ferguson on Foucauldian theories of power has been paradigmatic in framing subsequent engagements. If power is driven by disguise, then the role of critical scholarship is taken to be a critical unmasking of the political relations that underlie surface representations (Yarrow 2011). This approach has driven influential critiques of development policy (Apthorpe 1997; Shore and Wright 1997). Shore and Wright’s (1997) work has been particularly ground-breaking in this respect, highlighting the ‘mobilizing metaphors’ and ‘linguistic strategies’ through which, they suggest, policy operates.

Anthropologists have, then, focused on the historical conditions through which development policies are produced and the ‘inventedness’ of policy’s ‘taken-for-grantedness’ (Shore and Wright 1997: 15). In all these respects we suggest that anthropological critiques of development have been founded on the belief that anthropologists see more than various development because they know more. More or less explicitly, the basis of much of this knowledge (and hence vision) has been imagined as theoretical.

While the movement from more applied forms of development anthropology to a more critical anthropology of development can to some extent be seen as a temporal evolution, debates have persisted through the 1990s and 2000s between anthropologists with different views about the extent to which the application of anthropological ideas is a desirable or achievable aim. Thus Gardner and Lewis’s (1996) influential book can be seen as an important attempt to reappraise the forms of critical deconstruction that pervaded the 1990s. They suggest that whilst
post-structural influences lead to significant insights, too frequently these forms of critique end up in outright condemnation of development. This negates the potential for anthropologists to bring insights that positively affect the way in which development projects are undertaken. Hence they suggest that a more constructive relationship will emerge if anthropologists use their knowledge to actively inform, if not transform, development practice. In particular the book highlights the potential for anthropologists to counter the Western bias of development policies, to moderate the relationships between development institutions and the groups they seek to help, and hence to link ‘micro’ and ‘macro’ processes.

This perspective constituted an important corrective to some of the more critical elements of anthropology. Yet in certain respects the call for more sensitive and productive forms of anthropological critique leaves intact the assumption that such critiques would form the underlying basis of anthropological engagements with development. Whilst advocating a less adversarial approach, Gardner and Lewis leave implicit many of the assumed epistemological and theoretical asymmetries of the anthropologists they take to task.

**Questioning Critique**

What would it mean to move beyond these critical framings, and why might that move be productive? Although post-development critiques have certainly been productive, their asymmetries have led to a number of problems. An assumption of the superiority of anthropological knowledge has tended to preclude consideration of how anthropological knowledge could itself be illuminated by various forms of development practice. Such critiques have also tended to negate nuanced ethnographic understanding, since the complex, diverse and
often contradictory ideas that emerge in relation to development are frequently reduced to their assumed role in perpetuating inequality.

Since the advent of Malinowskian fieldwork, anthropologists have sought to understand the beliefs, practices and social relations of other groups of people as a means of shedding light on the beliefs and assumptions that anthropologists – and often by extension ‘Westerners’ – hold. In this way, a commitment to understanding other people’s lives on their own terms led to what Marilyn Strathern (1987) has termed ‘routine reflexivity’. By this, she refers to an underlying mode of anthropological knowledge production rather than to recent attempts to highlight the individual subjectivity of the ethnographer in the construction of anthropological knowledge. According to Strathern, suspension of the kinds of criticism that animate routine forms of ethnocentrism constitutes the very grounds on which anthropologists have critically apprehended their own theories and ideas about the world. Anthropology has grown through increasing differentiation of its own analytical concepts as these have been applied to different groups of people (Strathern 1991).

From this perspective, the kinds of critical scholarship that have characterized anthropological engagement with development over the past two decades lead to a troubling inversion. Where anthropologists have turned their attention to development practice, assumptions about anthropology’s theoretical, epistemological and empirical superiority have tended to militate against the forms of ‘routine reflexivity’ that have acted as a driver of theoretical innovation. In attempting to use anthropological insights to highlight development shortcomings, anthropologists have largely neglected to reflect upon what such encounters might teach us. Where anthropology is construed as a set of analytic or methodological resources to be
applied in illuminating development contexts, the potential for those contexts to illuminate, challenge or extend anthropological thinking is therefore foreclosed.

A related problem with prevailing forms of critique is that they tend to assume anthropology to be a set of practices and relationships that are self-evidently distinct from those that operate within various development contexts. Critical comment is thus premised upon a break between subject (anthropology) and object (development). Such assumptions preclude a more reflexive understanding of the concepts and practices through which anthropology works. By construing development’s difference from anthropology in terms of a deficit, these critiques have largely overlooked the extent to which anthropologists and development actors in fact engage in distinct forms of epistemological practice oriented towards distinct ends. In other words, the assumptions that frame and reproduce understandings of anthropology as critical resources to be applied to development work against a symmetrical (Latour 1993; Green this volume) treatment of anthropology and development as subjects of critical scrutiny in the same analytic terms. Assuming the superiority of anthropological knowledge thus forecloses sustained consideration of ways in which expertise and knowledge are constructed within anthropology and development in distinct, if overlapping, ways (cf. Li Murray 2007: 2).

If the critical framing of anthropology’s encounter with development has tended to preclude anthropological reflexivity (Lewis and Mosse 2006; Yarrow 2008b), it has also precluded nuanced ethnographic understanding for precisely the same reasons. Here we join with other anthropologists who have recently pointed to the forms of ethnographic reductionism that prevailing approaches have produced (Bornstein 2003; Englund 2006; Friedman 2006; Lewis and Mosse 2006; Mosse 2005; Yarrow 2008a). Mosse (2005), for example, points to a neofunctionalist logic whereby the decisions and beliefs of particular development actors are
reduced to their purported role in reproducing political inequalities. As such, he suggests, much of the anthropology of development has had the unfortunate effect of dissolving its object of study in the process of describing it. If all statements are taken to be dissembling acts, we lose a sense of the beliefs, ideas and voices of particular development actors (see also Fechter and Hindman 2011a). Where analysts assume that the discourses and practices of development are driven by the disguise of power, the beliefs, meanings and actions that development actors themselves privilege are overlooked. In this respect the language of disguise itself disguises important aspects of actors’ own realities (cf. Reed 2003)

<BDA>Beyond Critique

In attempting to move beyond the forms of critical deconstruction that have characterized anthropological engagements with development over the past two decades, we do not propose a break with critical scholarship per se. Rather we seek to unsettle some of the asymmetries that such critiques have both assumed and reproduced. We do this in the hope of producing more nuanced ethnographic accounts and hence more critical reflection on anthropology’s own ideas and practices.

In attempting to reorient anthropology in a direction that is simultaneously more ethnographic and more critically aware of its own analytic and theoretical limitations, we take inspiration from a small but significant body of work within anthropology. In particular Lewis and Mosse (2006) have called for a more ethnographic approach to development, one that stands apart from normative and instrumental ideologies, in order to better appreciate the complexities of particular contexts in which ideas of development become ethnographically meaningful (cf. Bornstein 2003; Ferguson 2006; Li Murray 2007; cf. Pigg 1997). Rather than the ideologically
informed critical deconstruction characteristic of mainstream anthropological approaches, their call is for methodological deconstruction. By this, they refer to the capacity for ethnography to highlight how apparently coherent policies and programmes emerge through the unscripted actions of heterogeneous actors. Instead of focusing on the analytic shortcomings of particular policies, anthropologists should seek to reveal the ‘hidden transcripts’ that coexist alongside the ‘public transcripts’ that development practitioners produce. Although framed in somewhat different terms, this move parallels our own insistence that anthropological accounts can usefully produce critical commentary only from the basis of ethnography that does not in the first instance take critique as its aim (Yarrow 2008b).

Neither critical nor neutral, this book thus constitutes an explicit attempt to reveal the moral and social worlds in which ideas of development are made meaningful, without becoming apologists for those that we study. Rather than critique generalized ‘development practice’, our collective aim is to shed light on particular development contexts (however defined) in the knowledge that particular critiques may usefully emerge from such understandings (see Friedman this volume). In this sense critical engagement with development practice is regarded as a negotiated outcome of development practice, rather than the a priori assumed mode of engagement.

Thus the innovation of the volume emerges in the ways that contributors extend and reconfigure existing theories by applying them to particular ethnographic contexts. In this respect, three main themes emerge, each of which speaks to existing debates whilst taking these in new directions. These are explored in the following three sections, which focus respectively on the ethnographic differentiation of ‘development’, the differentiation of different modes of anthropological engagement with development, and the ways in which various anthropologists
and development practitioners have thought about the relationship between acting and understanding.

**Development Multiple**

The book attempts to differentiate development as an object of study by ethnographically exploring the various meanings and practices that exist in the name of ‘development’ (cf. Mitchell 2002; cf. Olivier de Sardan 2005). Development has often been presented as a monolithic, Western set of ideas and practices. By contrast, this book reveals the diversity of ways in which ideas of ‘development’ are imbricated in the practices and relationships of otherwise socially, culturally and geographically distinct groups of people.

Arce and Long (2000) suggest the need to overcome a global-local dichotomy in anthropological theorizations about development, through a focus on the ‘counter-tendencies’ through which global development discourses are locally embedded and resisted. This focus importantly highlights the diversity of ways in which ideas of development become meaningful. However, a focus on ‘counter-tendencies’ and ‘resistance’ assumes that diversity and difference are located only at the level of ‘the local’. In contrast, a number of the contributors to this volume show the heterogeneity of thought and practice that exists in the name of ‘development’. In practice, ostensibly ‘global’ discourses emerge as negotiated outcomes of practices that entail specific forms of relationship and understanding. Thus, Jensen and Winthereik highlight how globally ubiquitous ideas of ‘partnership’ emerge through specific organizational practices. Similarly, Obeid shows how ideas of ‘participation’ become meaningful in the context of development NGOs that emerged within a very particular historical moment in Lebanon. In both cases, ostensibly ‘global’ forms of discourse emerge through the practices of particular actors. At
the same time, international development discourses provide the means by which people negotiate and frame social, cultural and political differences. In other words, development workers construct ideas of development and are in turn constructed by them. By demonstrating the diversity of ways in which this happens, contributors reveal the problems of conceptualizing development workers as a sociologically unified group (see also contributors to Fechter and Hindman 2011b).

In a related way, contributors to this book question the tendency for anthropological studies to conflate ‘development’ with a narrow focus on the activities and ideas of international development organizations. Indeed, not all development projects are international or ‘Western’ in origin. Mathur’s study of bureaucrats employed in implementing an ambitious Government of India project is a timely reminder of the fact that large development projects may well be national, and that we need to differentiate the local in our analyses. For Baviskar, this entails the need to broaden analyses of development to include the processes of capitalist accumulation that entail extraction, dispossession and displacement – and also, paradoxically, trigger demands for development.

Other contributors to the volume differentiate the concept of development by revealing how these ideas are integral to forms of practice that do not on the surface appear to be primarily ‘about’ development. In this way Kelly demonstrates how scientific practice in the Gambia is framed in terms of ideas of ‘progress’. Trundle similarly questions the separation between ‘development’ and ‘charity’. This has been central to delimiting not only the activities of organizations working in the ‘third world’ from those working in the West, but also the literatures that have arisen in relation to these activities. Yet as Trundle shows, this is a separation that conceals important parallels.
Differentiating Anthropology

If anthropologists of development have tended to imagine ‘development’ in relatively homogeneous terms, there has also been a parallel tendency to neglect the different forms that anthropological engagements with development take (cf. Gardner and Lewis 1996). As well as differentiating ‘development’ as an object of study, contributors to the volume draw out the multiplicity of ways of being anthropologists with interests in development. In particular these highlight the different kinds of relationships and engagements that can result from different methodological and theoretical standpoints. This diversity is evident in the different positions from which the various contributors to the volume narrate their accounts.

At one end of the spectrum, Green exemplifies a wider trend for anthropologists to work in large donor organizations as consultants or specialists, with particular forms of expertise. She notes the impossibility of sustaining commitment to the epistemological practices of both simultaneously in such contexts. Although it is possible to be an anthropologist and a development ‘practitioner’, one cannot hold both identities at the same time, since each works through a form of knowledge that eclipses the other (Riles 2001). Jensen and Winthereik’s analysis is also concerned with the overlapping forms of knowledge through which anthropology and development work, but their account is told from the rather different position of wanting to understand the practice of international development organizations through a process of ethnography. As ethnographers studying the material effects of discourses of ‘partnership’, they describe how their own interests became folded into this trope. In order to gain access to the field, they were required to do so as ‘partners’, producing knowledge that would be useful for the development practitioners they were interested in studying.
Arguably at the other extreme, Gledhill and Hita and Baviskar demonstrate the possibility for anthropologists to act as advocates for the socially and politically marginal groups they have conventionally studied. From this perspective, nuanced understanding of particular practices and beliefs of ‘beneficiary’ groups reveals the shortcomings of the neoliberal approaches that have so often been favoured by international finance institutions. In contrast to top-down development, as described by Baviskar, is bottom-up development, or initiatives that originate from the grass roots. Taylor and Rousseau came to think about ‘development’ because Vanuatu actors’ own interests in reorienting their lives presented a situation in which the ethnographic ubiquity of ‘development’ made it difficult to ignore. Likewise, Mathur’s essay focuses on the desire for development (or *vikas*) in a marginal region of India and the workings-out of development in government offices committed to implementing an ambitious plan while simultaneously recognizing its problems.

Taken in the round, these accounts demonstrate how different points of entry into the field lead to very different kinds of analyses. The subject positions we occupy determine not only the questions that we ask but also the answers that we get. Questions concerning the kinds of relationships that anthropologists have with their subjects are not only methodological but frame the very terms in which ‘development’ can be thought about and theorized. As Jensen and Winthereik point out, the elements of ‘development’ that come into view do not depend simply on the theoretical perspective adopted by the analyst or researcher, but on where and how they move through organizations and contexts. If development actors and interests are folded into anthropological practice in a multitude of ways, then we need to be aware of the diverse forms that anthropological engagements with development issues and practices can take.
The relationship between anthropology and development has often been conceived in relatively abstract terms, as a theoretical issue of how to reconcile different kinds of knowledge. By contrast, contributors to this volume emphasize the importance of understanding the social and institutional contexts in which such encounters concretely take place. In particular, Green highlights how an anthropological belief in the power of textual critique negates understanding of different regimes of knowledge through which anthropology and development work. If the usefulness or applicability of such texts (whether anthropologically authored or otherwise) is socially constructed through specific practices of development, then anthropologists’ own reification of textual forms of critique to some extent miss the point. In different ways, contributors highlight the need to take seriously the kinds of relationships that anthropologists sustain in the field, not simply as a means to the end of ‘better’ knowledge, but as ends in their own right. Whether such relationships entail NGO and development workers, or communities in which development projects are undertaken, these concrete interactions themselves entail forms of engagement that have potentially transformative effects.

Conceived in abstract terms, the relationship between anthropology and development has often seemed intractable. While anthropologists frequently chastise development workers for their lack of social and cultural knowledge, development workers at times regard this knowledge as unnecessarily complex and point to the difficulty of applying it. Yet if, as contributors to this volume suggest, anthropology and development are both highly heterogeneous forms of practice, then their relationship must also be understood in more nuanced and differentiated terms. Rather than talk of ‘the’ relationship between anthropology and development, it might be more useful to talk of relationships between anthropologists and various groups of people with interests in development. Although these relationships may entail tension and misunderstanding, they often
have productive outcomes. Indeed, the productivity of such relations often depends on the ontological and epistemological differences these engender (cf. Englund 2011; Venkatesan 2010.

Whilst contributors to the volume question monolithic visions of anthropology and development by paying attention to heterogeneity within both, they also question the tendency to assume that anthropology and development are necessarily categorically opposed projects. Rather than assume an opposition between anthropology and development as the self-evident starting point of analysis, contributors take the issue of how these practices may be similar or different as an open question. Understanding how anthropology and development use knowledge differently requires understanding both sets of practices in the same terms (Green this volume). This leads to a more nuanced account of overlapping ways in which both anthropologists and development workers operate.

<HDA>Acting and Understanding

The volume brings to light a more reflexive understanding of anthropological practice by moving beyond the forms of critical engagement that have characterized anthropological commentaries on development. As Green (this volume) suggests, this critical stance amounts in Latourian (Latour 1987, 1993, 1999) terms to an asymmetry, since only one half of the categorical divide – development – is subjected to critical scrutiny. Where anthropologists have assumed the superiority of anthropological knowledge as more complex and sophisticated, they have tended to overlook the ways in which development practices may in fact shed light on the assumptions and practices through which anthropologists work. In particular, contributors to the volume reveal how development practice sheds light on the relationship between understanding and action in anthropology.
Within the anthropology of development (e.g., Gardner and Lewis 1996; e.g., Olivier de Sardan 2005), as in anthropological studies more generally (e.g., Fortun 2001; Tsing 2005), the question of how anthropology is to have more impact on the world on which it comments has become increasingly central. Anthropologists of development have thus been vexed by their critiques’ lack of tangible impact. This perceived inability to produce tangible changes in practice has often been taken as a stimulus to produce more, better or different forms of critique. Perhaps it should be unsurprising, for anthropologists whose own actions are routinely directed at the production of texts, that a failure to produce desired impacts should be taken as a failure of those texts. Arguably this turns on a misguided belief in the capacity of texts to act in and of themselves.

Throughout this book, accounts of the relationship between acting and understanding call into question any straightforward opposition between anthropology and development as one between understanding and acting. Rather than imagine ‘action’ as a self-evident domain of practice, various contributors reveal ‘action’ as a form that orients practice in particular ways. Thus in the context of an Episcopal food bank in Florence, Trundle elucidates how charity workers’ commitment to ‘doing’ emerges as a particular ‘aesthetic’. In this way she describes how charity workers direct attention to the means rather than the ends of ‘action’. In the very different context of international development practices in Tanzania, Green makes a parallel point, highlighting the social practices through which development workers make knowledge ‘act’. Her suggestion is that development knowledge, in contrast to academic knowledge, is itself understood as a form of ‘action’. Unlike academics, development practitioners are concerned to make ideas work – to make concepts have effects. This is not simply a matter of using more applied forms of knowledge, but of orienting social and institutional practices in such a way that
their effects are made apparent. In other words, it is not only that anthropologists and development practitioners have different ways of doing knowledge, but also that they have different ways of representing knowledge within their own practices.

In this way, contributors to the volume produce a more nuanced understanding of the importance of ‘action’ in development, by questioning the taken-for-granted status of the term in much development practice. At the same time, ethnographic engagement with these ideas and practices leads to a reconsideration of the ideas and practices through which anthropologists themselves operate. Despite the reflexive turn that has reoriented anthropological analyses since the 1980s, anthropologists have been reluctant to apprehend their own disciplinary practices anthropologically (Green this volume). As such, ‘reflexivity’ has tended to refer to a heightened attention to anthropology’s modes of representation, both textually and as they have emerged in relation to fieldwork. By contrast, contributors to this volume highlight in different ways how understanding development practice sheds new light on the social relations and practices that underpin anthropological work.

In particular, contributors highlight how anthropological practice is underpinned by a break between field and desk (cf. Mosse 2006). In this vein, both Green and Kelly suggest that anthropology routinely separates understanding from action, abstracting anthropological theories and ‘knowledge’ from the specific social relations through which they emerge. Seen from this perspective, fieldwork is the means to the end of knowledge, just as social relations established through participant observation are imagined as the means to the end of textually elucidated theory. This insight is used by Green to highlight the mutually eclipsing forms of knowledge through which anthropology and development operate.
Seen from this perspective, anthropology has largely failed to impact upon development practice not because it has failed to produce sufficiently compelling critiques, but because anthropologists misunderstand the social practices through which development workers make knowledge ‘act’, or at least appear to do so. Yet an appreciation of the different ways in which anthropologists and development workers use knowledge also has potentially more positive applications. Thus Kelly proposes that scientific trials in the Gambia might offer anthropology a way of reorienting its own fieldwork practices. Although these practices may appear problematic, they bring to light how social relations are both the practice and the product of social research. This suggests the possibility that anthropologists need to reappraise the role and importance of such relations, not just as the means to the end of knowledge, but as sources of insight and transformation in their own right. Similarly, Green suggests that if anthropologists and development workers are to come together, this will not simply take place through new forms of knowledge, but through new forms of social relationship. At the same time, anthropologists do already sustain many different kinds of relationships with development workers and beneficiaries. Hence we also need to pay more attention to relationships that are already in existence but rarely explicitly valued.

Although various contributors thus highlight the problems of a naïve belief in the transformative potential of academic critique, this does not amount to an outright dismissal of critical scholarship as a potential basis for action. Rather, the volume moves beyond the relatively abstract terms in which post-development theorists have dismissed ‘development’, in order to produce more differentiated forms of critique. As Friedman insightfully points out, if we shed the post-development conception of development as a product of Western knowledge and power, we not only produce a more nuanced understanding of development practice, but in doing
so create spaces for different, more creative and more flexible types of intervention. It is perfectly possible for anthropologists to support particular development projects on the basis of ethnographic understanding of the situation in which these emerge, without supporting Western knowledge and power per se. By the same token, anthropological critiques are more likely to shape development practice when they emerge in relation to specific projects, programmes or discourses.

Contributors also highlight the need to be aware of the different contexts in which their own knowledge circulates. In the context of anthropological dealings with development organizations, abstractly framed academic critiques may have limited purchase – not because they are academically problematic, but because of the different ways in which development organizations and academics construct knowledge. Yet in seeking to bring about social transformation or improvement, direct relationships with development institutions are not the only means available. Thus Gledhill and Hita highlight the potential for anthropologists to undermine neoliberal visions of development by lending direct support to those who are negatively impacted by them. By the same token, Baviskar writes of displaced and dispossessed groups of people in India with an eye to employing the experience of subalterns to critical effect. Although it is unlikely that such anthropological interventions can entirely ameliorate the deleterious effects of the processes they write about, this does not mean that such interventions cannot be useful or transformative. How or whether they are so does not depend upon their academic validity in a narrow sense, but on their success in enrolling support. In the context of Brazil, Gledhill and Hita thus draw attention to the potential importance of collaborations with NGOs and community organizations. In the context of India, Baviskar illuminates how the success of academic critiques in part depends on their effectiveness in enrolling media support.
**Conclusion**

If what unifies the contributors to this volume is precisely their commitment to ethnographic engagement, it should not be surprising that the chapters themselves provide a startlingly diverse set of descriptions and analyses. Through these, development is differentiated as both (and simultaneously) an ethnographic and a theoretical concern. Yet beyond the different perspectives encompassed, this heterogeneity of ethnographic and theoretical perspectives makes its own point. Collectively the essays do not simply add up to a new perspective within the anthropology of development, but expose the limits of a project framed in those terms. Our suggestion is not that new theories or insights are needed to reenergize this sub-discipline of anthropology, but that the very terms in which it is set up need rethinking. Broadly speaking, we have pointed to three main problems with the anthropology of development: that ‘development’ has been imagined in insufficiently differentiated terms; that correspondingly there has been a failure to appreciate the diversity of ways in which anthropologists engage in/with ‘development’; and that the anthropological imagination of this relationship in asymmetrical terms leads to a problematic application of anthropological theories ‘to’ development contexts.

By contrast, the approaches represented within this book are more accurately summarized as ‘anthropologies with development in them’. In one sense this admittedly cumbersome term captures a shift signalled by others from an analytic concern with development to a more ethnographic understanding of the meanings and resonances that the term acquires in particular social contexts (e.g. Olivier de Sardan 2005; Venkatesan 2009, 2010). At another level and perhaps more profoundly, the term also points to a need to frame such ethnographies as much through the lens of a wider regional and anthropological literature as in relation to other studies.
of ‘development’ (see Yarrow 2011). By locating issues of development more squarely in relation to mainstream anthropological concerns, our hope is not only that a more nuanced understanding of the different ways of imagining and defining the concept of ‘development’ will result, but also (consequently) that in the process, anthropology will grow through extension and refinement of its core concepts. Our suggestion is that this can only happen when anthropologists relinquish the belief that critique should provide both the means and the ends of engagement with development issues.

At the start of the chapter we alluded to the paradox that the critical unmasking of ‘development’ brought about by over two decades of sustained deconstruction erases hope in the prospect of positive social change. This volume reveals a level of ethnographic complexity from which it would be churlish to argue for the replacement of this predominantly ‘negative’ vision of ‘development’ with a more ‘positive’ one. Yet a genuinely ethnographic understanding of the contexts in which ideas of development are made to matter does at least open up spaces for hope (Miyazaki 2004; Yarrow 2010). As contributors show, development is not one thing but many, and not all of them are bad. It is only by moving beyond the ideologically charged rhetoric that has attended many of the anthropological critiques of development, that we will come to see what development can mean in a more nuanced and perhaps more productive light. Whilst it is certainly not our intention to produce applied solutions to development problems, in different ways the chapters open up new understandings of what development is and might mean. It remains our hope that these provide the grounds for imagining different, more varied, humane and just kinds of future.

<HDA>Bibliography


People all over the world rely on modes of production, distribution, and consumption in order to provide food and other commodities necessary in life. These modes differ based on culture in the ways that humans relate to and make use of the natural environment, how humans relate to each other, and how the institutions of society and federal states cause change. Production is the various forms of transformation of nature’s raw materials into a form more suitable for human use. Distribution is the way commodities are provided to consumers. Consumption is the way people use the commodities they have received to fulfill their needs and desires. The way we produce, distribute, and consume also has an environmental impact.

At first sight international development and anthropology have much in common: a shared concern with social transformation in the world’s poorer places and similar histories as disciplines evolving through particular colonial and postcolonial conjunctures of knowledge and power (Escobar 1995; Ferguson 1997).