Big Time College Football & The Perils of Presidential Control

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Presidential control of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) athletic programs with membership in the Football Bowl Series (FBS) Subdivision is constrained by a gridiron marketplace that favors winning and commercial interests. Presidents have a limited set of choices to navigate this marketplace while making decisions in athletics that also reflect the educational values of doctorate-granting institutions. Years of experience, the stage of legitimacy (Bornstein 2003), and the level of ambiguity in the campus environment (Cohen & March, 1974; 1986), all influence the individual and collective level of presidential control. The issue of presidential control at Penn State reminds us that the length of time of a presidency and the balance of power at the top are important indicators of decision-making. Average term of presidents and the composition of presidential cohort data is presented from secondary reports (ACE, 2012; Hoffman, 2012; Ross, Green, & Henderson, 1993; Cohen & March 1986; Cohen & March, 1974) and the IAL database. This data on presidential terms, ambiguity in the campus environment, and legitimacy of presidential leadership help illustrate their individual and collective power to act in favor of the gridiron marketplace or institutional interests.

Penn State has been an anomaly in college athletics at the Division I level for quite some time. From its iconic coach, to the unchanged jersey’s, and earlier reluctance to join an athletic conference, Penn State was in many ways unique. What is not unique however, are the leadership challenges of Division I college sports and the perils they hold for presidents of institutions with big time football programs. Behind the classic football image of Penn State is a high stakes program that is part of a larger gridiron marketplace. This marketplace rewards those institutions that leverage the imagery of college football tradition and history, while concealing the dilemmas of control, integrity, and commercialism often inconsistent with the educational
enterprise. At Penn State this was taken to a debilitating extreme. Just as Penn State’s football program was an anomaly, so too was the arrangement of power in the upper echelons of university administration.

The leadership of Penn State’s football program – the president, athletic director, and head coach - were a novelty in athletics because of their individual and collective longevity. President Graham Spanier, Head Football Coach Joe Paterno, and Athletic Director Tim Curley had been on campus much longer than any of their peers among National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) Division I Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS) programs (16, 44, and 18 years respectively). The early part of the Penn State case focused on former assistant coach Jerry Sandusky. Later the investigation turned to others, including Graham Spanier, former president of Penn State. Knowledge about his conduct in the events may continue to evolve in the coming years, but what will remain the same are the questions about presidential power and leadership of college football that led to such extraordinary circumstances. Power that Graham Spanier accumulated over time at Penn State led to questions about the protection of football and a previously unimaginable concealing of abuse to preserve broader institutional and athletic interests. There are also questions about the balance of power between Joe Paterno, Tim Curley, and Graham Spanier. The questions of presidential control and college athletics highlighted in the Penn State case underscore the dilemmas about the scope of power presidents have at their own individual institution and their role in the leadership of college football overall. The conditions by which presidents individually call for reforms, but collectively have limited reach in the control of Division I college athletics remain even in the wake of Penn State.

The 1991 Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics (KCIA) Report, A Call to Action: Reconnecting College Sports and Higher Education, urged several Division I athletics reforms and set an agenda for college and university presidents to lead higher education through these reforms in ways that would bring athletics in closer alignment with educational values. This initial report by the Knight Commission suggested four aspects of presidential control over athletics. Among these were obligations to control conferences, the NCAA, and their institutions’ involvement with commercial television (KCIA, 1991). The Knight Commission emphasized shared action by presidents, trustees, conferences, faculty, and others to address the disconnect between athletics and higher education. Furthermore, the Knight Commission acknowledged that no single president could act alone. Instead, the transformation of intercollegiate athletics would require college presidents working in concert with one another to effect necessary change (KCIA, 1991). Since 1991, presidents acting alone or together have had little success in instituting meaningful reform.

Efforts by presidents are constrained by a gridiron marketplace characterized by an intensely competitive environment that emphasizes winning and commercial interests. Although concerns over program integrity are taking a more prominent role in the public discourse, there is no indication that these concerns are altering the gridiron marketplace. There have been few if any college and university presidents of FBS programs that have been able to individually steer substantive changes at their own institution and only a few have worked collectively to implement new policies. When presidents come together over reforms is it usually part of the NCAA’s governance structure or special committee.

The focus in this essay is on what is known about strategies for success and threats to presidential leadership of intercollegiate athletics. A president holds both symbolic as well as direct responsibility for the athletic program and the institution. The purpose here is to examine presidential control in the higher education setting and provide data that illustrates the term of
presidents of FBS member institutions. Together this data and the frame of presidential control offer insights into the precarious position presidents occupy when attempting to exert influence and oversee systems of accountability in Division I FBS programs.

**Presidential Control**

The power and authority of presidents in colleges and universities is unique among other modern social institutions such as corporations or the military where there is often a clear order of power and authority (Clotfelter, 2011). “Unlike armies and business corporations, which tend to have clear objectives and disciplined hierarchical command structures, universities feature vague missions, decentralized organization charts, and weak presidents” (Clotfelter, 2011, p. 32). There are many constituents on a university campus with varying degrees of power and authority – the board, faculty, alumni, students to some extent, and even departments.

Presidential leadership in higher education has been characterized as organized anarchy in an environment where ambiguity is the norm (Cohen & March, 1986; see also 1974). Presidents navigate ambiguity in four distinct areas – ambiguity of purpose, power, the experience, and success. Questions arise about the terms in which action is justified, the power of the president, inferences that can be made about the experience, and how to know when the president is successful. Furthermore:

These ambiguities are fundamental to college presidents because they strike at the heart of the usual interpretations of leadership. When purpose is ambiguous, ordinary theories of decision-making and intelligence become problematic. When power is ambiguous, ordinary theories of social order and control become problematic. When experience is ambiguous, ordinary theories of learning and adaptation become problematic. When success is ambiguous, ordinary theories of motivation and personal pleasure become problematic (Cohen & March, 1986, p. 195).

Nowhere are the frames of ambiguity in purpose, power, experience, and success more useful than in the oversight and leadership of college sports. The purpose of intercollegiate athletics lacks a consistent, shared objective across campus, community, and commercial interests. Furthermore, these inconsistencies are masked by incomplete measures for goals that do exist. Commonly promoted goals of FBS athletic programs include promoting the university and providing entertainment and a forum to enhance connection to the campus community. Yet the extent to which these goals have been met often lacks clarity. Even more problematic seems to be consensus on when the goals of the athletic program have not been met to a degree that they violate broader campus interests until they reach an untenable extreme, warranting intervention from the president.

Ambiguity in power with regard to athletics is particularly problematic for the president. Athletic directors and conference commissioners drive conference level decision-making with regard to lucrative BCS television contracts (KCIA, 2001) and conference realignment that feature football interests over other campus interests. In an illustrative example, the University of Maryland’s decision to leave the Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) for an invitation to the Big Ten was done under a veil of secrecy, where Maryland President Wallace Loh entered into a confidentiality agreement prohibiting a transparent deliberative process that would have allowed

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for the decision to be vetted among various constituencies. In explaining his opposition to a
board vote ultimately concluding in Maryland moving to the Big Ten, former U.S. Congressman
Tom McMillen (2012) wrote

Reasonable people certainly can discuss the benefits and risks of this move. But
confidentiality agreements imposed by the commissioner of the Big Ten squelched any
real debate. Public universities receiving taxpayer money are supposed to operate under
shared governance, but what happened at Maryland was governance by secrecy and
exclusion.

While representatives of the athletic department and Big Ten officials were the principle
parties exerting pressure on President Loh, in other circumstances alumni, boosters and even
members of the Board of Regents can push for their own interests and influences in athletics,
presenting challenges for presidents asserting power over the control of athletics. Ambiguity in
experiences and successes in the context of athletics vary greatly from president to president.
Personal experience with athletics plays a central role in how presidents perceive athletics
(KCIA, 2009) and there is little training or preparation. It takes time for new presidents to
develop an understanding of athletics. Furthermore, successes in the athletic department beyond
wins and losses in football often go unnoticed.

Among the anarchy and ambiguity that characterize the context of presidential leadership
in higher education, presidents must also achieve and maintain legitimacy. According to
Bornstein (2003) this is the most essential element for a president in higher education. Successful
academic presidents are adept at achieving legitimacy in three distinct stages: gaining legitimacy,
creating legitimate change, and assuring a legitimate presidential succession. Presidents who
succeed at these three general stages persist. Those that do not successfully fend off threats to
legitimacy are more likely to fail. However, Bornstein is also quick to point out that among the
factors that threaten legitimacy, bad luck (which is largely external factors beyond the control of
the president), and events in intercollegiate athletics pose the greatest threats to a president’s
term:

Big-time athletics presents a minefield of decisions, which can threaten
presidential survival. In response to ongoing pressure from boosters for athletic
victories, presidents tacitly or overtly, may violate ethical practice by condoning
fraud and NCAA rule violations…Such practices may also occur through a
president’s inattentiveness to the athletic program or through a grandiose sense of
imperviousness to accepted standards (Bornstein, 2003, p. 56).

When viewed through the frames of ambiguity and legitimacy among academic presidents, it
becomes clearer how big-time athletics fuels a culture where presidents lack either the will,
practical knowledge, or authority to assert control over college football (Duderstadt, 2007;
KCIA, 2001; 2009; Green, Jaschik, & Lederman, 2012).

**Presidential Control of College Football**

College sports at the FBS level are complex organizations with multiple constituencies
and many interests. The day-to-day operations of the department are the responsibility of the
athletic director. The president is only involved in these decisions insofar as the university’s
broad interests are involved (Duderstadt, 2007). It is the responsibility of presidents to protect the athletic department from “inappropriate intrusion by alumni and boosters, the media, and occasionally even the regents” particularly among matters where the athletic department drifts away from the academic mission of the institution (Duderstadt, 2007, p. 320). On the other hand, it is not uncommon for presidents at institutions with high profile football programs to have an equally high profile celebrity coach. These high profile coaches also command high salaries and these salaries can place presidents at a disadvantage in perceived, if not real power. In the words of one college president, the power to control intercollegiate athletics lies with the coaches, not the presidents. “In terms of control over big-time college athletics, I don’t believe we have control. Show me a president who won’t meet the demands of a winning coach who has the chance to walk out the door for a higher salary someplace else” (KCIA, 2009, p.18; see also Clotfelter, 2011; Moltz, 2009).

Presidential control of FBS athletic programs in the market of big time sport is an area of concern among presidents themselves. In 2009, the Knight Commission presented findings from a survey of Division I presidents. Presidents who responded to the survey recognized the need for reforms, but lacked solutions for reform (KCIA, 2009). Part of the lack of reform solutions was related to limitations on their own campus to address the issues brought on by the financing of Division I football and external influences such as “lucrative television contracts that…diminished presidents’ authority over athletics” (KCIA, 2009, p. 8). These financial interests constrain the ability of presidents to influence campus or broader levels of reform. Furthermore, presidents reported that much of the potential for reform resides at the conference level, but the most powerful institutions will not act in ways that run counter to their self-interest in conference level decision-making (KCIA, 2009). One president in the study observed, “The presidents who have had their heads handed to them? A high percentage of them had that happen because it was something to do with athletics” (KCIA, 2009, p. 15). Whether acting too strongly for reform or the limitations on power from external income or other pressures, presidents are in a precarious position to effect changes that run counter to contemporary trends such as in spending or conference realignment.

Higher education operates in the market economy of American society. In this market institutions must find new resources to fuel teaching and research in the face of declining public revenue from state subsidies for tuition and federal grants for research. Entrepreneurial faculty and students generate revenue from innovation in the laboratory, clinic or out in the field, replacing some of the lost resources. Constraints over increased demands and declining resources add incentive for more commercialization across the academy. Robert Zemsky (2009) notes, “The challenge, given the constant lure of revenue in a market economy is how to keep commercialism within bounds” (p. 48). In the broader market of higher education presidents have not acted individually or collectively to shift the pace or scale of commercialization in gridiron marketplace. Rather it is often quite the opposite. The summer of 2012 brought a vote by a committee of presidents from the FBS conferences to implement a playoff model in 2014 that will bring in an estimated $400-600 million in new college football revenue (Grasgreen, 2012a).

As one president in the Knight Commission survey noted, “presidents of big schools aren’t listening and they don’t want to. There are lots of fans and lots of dough working against that. They don’t want to push back against these interests” (KCIA, 2009, p. 16). This inability or unwillingness to push back against interests in the marketplace and lower spending raises questions about the role of the president and his or her ability to control the football program.
An Inside Higher Ed survey of 122 presidents from NCAA Division I institutions found that only 25.2% agree or strongly agree that presidents are in control of their athletic programs. (Green, Jaschik, & Lederman, 2012, p. 18). And yet, 86.7% of Division I presidents surveyed by Inside Higher Ed, responded agree or strongly agree that the institution’s board would “back me if I had major conflicts with top coaches or athletic directors” (Green, Jaschik, & Lederman, 2012, p. 18). This juxtaposition between presidential views that they have little control of athletes with a majority belief that presidents would receive support from their governing boards in athletics matters begs the question of where the threshold is for tolerating presidential action and at what point do they become vulnerable.

Presidents at universities with FBS football programs must be also aware how important it is for American higher educational institutions to garner attention and acquire academic status. This theme appeared in the decision by the University of Maryland to join the Big 10 in the autumn of 2012, citing financial stability for the athletic program and the ability to join the Big 10’s research consortium, Committee on Institutional Cooperation (CIC) (Grasgreen, 2012b). Critics assert that the move was less about joining the prestigious CIC and more about addressing an ailing athletic budget - the Maryland athletic department was in serious financial trouble, borrowing $1 million from the institution to cover budget overruns. However the teams Maryland lines up against on the other side of the line of scrimmage also carry broader institutional impacts.

The issue of leveraging academic prestige through the gridiron marketplace is part of the dilemma of institutional control for presidents. It is not enough to maintain satisfactory or even exceptional programs on campus, “there must be widespread perception of continued improvement and increasing status” (Toma, 2003, p. 1). Institutions can leverage athletics to accelerate their migration into the upper echelon of perceived status, “it is often through new academic specialties and through athletics that the universities seeking to rise in the academic hierarchy can most quickly and easily attract national attention” (Kerr, 2001, p. 68). Boise State University president, Dr. Robert Kustra described this reality for his institution during the recent conference expansion of the Pac-12. “When you are going into the Pac-10, it’s not just the stadium or competition. It’s about what kind of university you are…. it’s part of the reason why we are building our research programs and our graduate programs (Lifschitz, Sauder & Stevens, 2012, p. 35; see also Jaschik, 2012).

Oriard (2009) found that all but 6 out of 35 schools in the US News & World Report ranking were FBS member schools and that only one school is not in a BCS Automatic Qualifying conference. Furthermore, American Association of Universities (AAU) member schools are “heavily weighted toward big-time football schools” (Oriard, 2009, p. 241). The fact that losses due to declines in public funding of higher education have been replaced with private fund-raising does not go unnoticed in the question of whether big-time football has an effect on development.

Lifschitz, Sauder, and Stevens (2012) examined the link between athletic and academic prestige in a study of 283 colleges and universities from 1896-2010 and found that the structuring of intercollegiate athletic contests through athletic conferences creates “a national matrix of organizational identities and prestige [and] among coalescing schools” (Lifschitz, Sauder & Stevens, 2012, p. 4). Athletic conferences become status clubs where members compete in athletic contests. These contests become part of the rituals that mutually reciprocate status among schools. Football serves as an “influential status system that coexists” with other
status systems such as academics, contributing a component to which judgments about status in higher education are made (Lifschitz, Sauder & Stevens, 2012, p. 4).

**The Term of Presidents**

The overall responsibility for the control of the athletic department and the football program itself falls under the institution’s president (Duderstadt, 2003), but many additional pressures and responsibilities impinge on the president. The individual term of a president at a given school is one measure of his or her influence at that institution. The overall composition of FBS institutions can signal their collective experience and potential ability to act in harmony with one another for broader reforms.

Who becomes the president, how long her or his term may be, and the circumstances for departure vary greatly (American Council on Education [ACE], 2012). Even defining term or tenure is not uniformly estimated. Cohen and March (1974; 1986) developed a set of five measures that illustrate how the term or tenure of a president might be calculated:

1. The backward cohort – the distribution of tenure for presidents *completing their term* in a particular year. The average term in the backward cohort is the number of years served prior to leaving the institution in a given cohort year.

2. The forward cohort. The distribution of tenure for presidents *beginning their term* in a specific year. The forward cohort tenure is not known until individual presidents leave the institution in the future.

3. Additional tenure. The distribution of *additional tenure for presidents now in office*. Thus the average tenure (in this sense) for presidents in office in a current year is the average number of years served between that year and the date of leaving the presidency. This distribution is knowable at some later date, but it may be estimated in the current year.

4. Completed tenure. The distribution of completed tenure for presidents in office on a particular date. Thus the average tenure (in this sense) for a given year is the *average number of years in office for all presidents in office* in a specific year. The distribution is knowable in that year.

5. Full tenure. The *distribution of full tenure* (completed plus future) for presidents in the current year. The average tenure (in this sense) for a given year is the average number of years in the full term of office for all presidents in office for the current year. This distribution is knowable only later but can be estimated in the current year.

There are several reports that illustrate the term of presidents using these and other measures (ACE, 2012; Hoffman, 2012; Ross, Green, & Henderson, 1993; Cohen & March 1986; Cohen & March, 1974). These include reports on the role of the president and are presented as a comparison point to presidents from Division I FBS institutions. When just comparing FBS member NCAA schools to doctorate granting schools overall, the average is calculated...
somewhat differently. The ACE reporting uses a self-reported average measured in years and months in office as defined by the completed tenure definition above.

Data for FBS institution presidents is from the Intercollegiate Athletics Leadership Database. This database contains information on several individual administration and staff roles from 1991-2011. Data from the IAL database represents the term of individuals in role (i.e. president) at specific institutions between 1991-2011 by cohort year average. The IAL database does not include the actual term or full tenure of individual president’s career in all cases. Individual terms that begin before 1991 are not accounted for in full. This cohort average is similar to the full tenure definition, with the start of the football season as the beginning of the cohort year. Because there is some deviation in the full-tenure measure in the IAL database, the cohort average in earlier years reflect a modified forward average.

In Leadership & Ambiguity Cohen and March (1974; 1986) cite Kerr’s 1970 analysis of AAU presidents on the mean number of years current presidents had been in office in five selected years from 1899 to 1969. From 1899 to 1969 the overall average of presidents at AAU members institutions dropped from 10.9 years in 1899 to 5.9 years in 1969 (Table 1). In Unsportsmanlike Conduct: Exploiting College Athletes, Walter Byers former NCAA president estimated that from 1989-1994 58% of Division I-A presidents changed institutions. Over a 10-year period from the 1984-85 academic year to the 1994-95 academic year only 19 percent of presidents (n=20) had not changed institutions (Byers, 1995).

Table 1 - Mean Number of Years In Office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1929</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>1969</th>
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<tr>
<td>10.9 years</td>
<td>9.5 years</td>
<td>7.7 years</td>
<td>7.4 years</td>
<td>5.9 years</td>
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In 1993 the ACE report, The American College President: A 1993 Edition surveyed 130 presidents at doctorate granting public schools had a self-reported average of 4.8 years and 67 presidents at independents had an average of 6.4 years in their current presidency for an average of 5.4 years in 1990 (Ross, Green & Henderson, 1993) (Table 2). This was down slightly from 1986, where the overall mean years of service was 6.1 years; with presidents at public institutions reporting a mean of 5.1 years and independent schools the mean was 8.2 years (Ross, Green & Henderson, 1993). The 2012 ACE report under the same title, found that presidents at doctorate granting public schools had a mean of 5.8 years in their present job and presidents at independents had an average of 6.8 years in their current presidency (Table 2) for an overall average of 6.2 years. This was down 1.4 years from 2006, where the mean years of service at doctorate granting schools was 7.6 years (ACE, 2012).

Table 2 - Mean Years of Service By Year, Doctorate Granting & FBS Institutions

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>6.1*</td>
<td>5.4*</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7.6^</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>6.2^</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAL Database</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Sources: ACE (1993*, 2012^) – Doctorate, Mean Years of Service; Intercollegiate Athletics Leadership Database

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The composition of all presidents over time varies somewhat between the ACE report and the IAL database, but overall the composition of presidents appears to favor a cohort in the two categories of 6-10 year and 11-15 years. In the earlier 1993 ACE report 58% of presidents self-reported being in the first 5 years of their presidency in 1990. This was almost identical to the 60% of presidents in the first 5 years of their presidency in 1986. In the later 2012 ACE report, the response rate remained consistent but the proportion of presidents in the first 5 years at their current institution was slightly lower at 41% (2006) and 47% (2012). The composition of presidents at doctorate granting institutions had shifted and in the 2012 ACE report more presidents were found in the 6-10 years and 11-15 years categories than in the earlier 1993 report.

Table 3 - Average Years in Current Presidency, Doctorate-Granting Institutions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>1986*</th>
<th>1990*</th>
<th>2006^</th>
<th>2011^</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>47%</td>
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<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>37%</td>
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<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
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<tr>
<td>16+</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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Source: ACE (1993*, 2012^)

Among FBS member institutions the composition of presidents is similar between the ACE report and the IAL database despite the differences in how the averages are calculated (Table 4). The composition of presidents diverges somewhat in the 0-5 year and 6-10 year categories for the 2011 cohort. This could be attributed in part due to the differences in how the data is collected, which presidents responded to the ACE survey, or real differences in the turnover in the current cohort of presidents between FBS and non-FBS member institutions. It should also be noted that the IAL database cohort average reported for 2011 is closer to a completed tenure average than the other cohort years reported by the IAL database, making the differences between the ACE report (2012) and the IAL database important to track in future reporting.

Table 4 - Average Years in Full Presidency By Cohort Year, FBS Institutions

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-10</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-15</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16+</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Intercollegiate Athletics Leadership Database

At the institutional level, frequent turnover in leadership can leave the institution or its programs adrift. Longer leadership terms can promote unchecked power and institutional complacency. The issue of presidential term length and if it is declining is an important measure to follow. The issue of the interrelationship between those in power at the campus level is a complicated one as well and worthy of additional investigation. It is not just the term of leaders or the power they yield over the institution, but also the conditions that fuel expectations of football programs at the institutional and national level. For the leadership of the NCAA Football
Bowl Subdivision, the overall composition of presidents serves as a proxy for their collective legitimacy, shedding light on their overall will to act for reform or to escalate college football.

**Conclusion: 4th & 1**

The issue of how much time it takes a president to build the legitimacy necessary to actively operate in the ambiguity of power and success related to football is an important one. The years of experience at a given school and as a president overall signals a particular type of maturity in the role as president at that institution. It also suggests how prepared presidents are to exercise their individual and collective legitimacy to work for change. To borrow from a football analogy, where the head coach must make a decision between playing it safe and giving up control of the ball with a punt or ‘going for it’ and risking a turnover on downs, many presidents are in a similar predicament. James Duderstadt, former President at the University of Michigan has little faith in presidents to individually or collectively control football at their individual school or alter the contemporary gridiron marketplace. He observes,

Most university presidents are usually trapped between a rock and a hard place: on the one hand is a public demanding high-quality entertainment from the commercial college sports industry they are paying for; on the other are governing boards that have the capacity (and all too frequently the inclination) to fire presidents who rock the university boat too strenuously (Duderstadt, 1997, p. 325).

For the president who gives up more than just day-to-day control of the athletic program to the athletic director he or she knows that that strategy won’t be met with much resistance. But for the president who moves ahead aggressively, trying to control the athletic department, many perils await.

However, the abuses at Penn State - the cover-up and disregard for the welfare of children - cannot simply be explained by inexperience or limited options (Eder, 2012). Just based on his term of 16 years at Penn State Graham Spanier was in a very small cohort of presidents with a term of this length at doctorate granting (3% of presidents) and FBS level institutions (5% of presidents). The case of Penn State reminds us that the environment of ambiguity in the leadership of higher education presents challenges that are more deeply entrenched. With regard to decision-making in athletics it is often a few individuals with well-established campus or broader legitimacy that make swift or grandiose decisions without an obligation to shared campus governance. Where a given president’s power fits in that collection of decision-makers can be attributed in part to the length of service. Regardless of the term of service, the influence of the gridiron marketplace and the forces of institutional prestige that favor protecting or expanding the leverage of the football over almost any other interests, tell us that the perils of presidential leadership are likely to remain unchanged.
References


Notes

1. In the cases of Spanier and Curley, both had long histories with the university extending beyond their respective roles as administrators. Graham Spanier served as a faculty member and administrator in the College of Health and Human Development from 1973-1982. Tim Curley graduated from Penn State with a bachelor’s degree in physical education in 1976 and a master’s degree in child psychology in 1978. A local from the town of State College, Curley grew up across the street from Beaver Stadium and spent time throughout his boyhood working in the athletic department, serving as a bat boy for the baseball team and parking cars at events (Johnson, November, 2011).
Presidential control of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) athletic programs with membership in the Football Bowl Series (FBS) Subdivision is constrained by a gridiron marketplace that favors winning and commercial interests. Presidents have a limited set of choices to n In an era when college football coaches frequently command higher salaries than university presidents, many call for reform to restore the balance between amateur athletics and the educational mission of schools. This book traces attempts at college athletics reform from 1855 through the early twenty-first century while analyzing the different roles played by students, faculty, conferences, university presidents, the NCAA, legislatures, and the Supreme Court. Pay for Play: A History of Big-Time College Athletic Reform also tackles critically important questions about eligibility, compensation,...