Cosmopolitan Localism: A Decolonial Shifting of the Kantian’s Legacies*

Walter Mignolo

Abstract

Cosmopolitan localism simply means that if cosmopolitan ideals are seriously considered, there is no need to take Kant as the blue print. Kant should be taken as a local ideal of a cosmopolitan world, the European idea. Since such imperial cosmopolitanism now is untenable, it is necessary to reduce Kantian legacies to size for there are many other local histories in which cosmopolitan projects emerge. It is already enough to have taken the idea of the cosmo-polis or orbis-terrārum as horizons of life. It is not necessary to carry with it the feelings, ideals, sentiments and desires of those who proposed the terms. Reducing Kantian legacies to size means that Euro-American concepts of cosmopolitanism have the right to exist but have no right to expect to be universal. Cosmopolitan localism means the multiplication of nodes, the active

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intervention of local cosmopolitan project from all over the world and the reduction of Western cosmopolitans to its own local history.

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I.
I.1.

In 2000 I published an article in *Public Culture* titled “The Many-Faces of Cosmopolis: Border Thinking and Critical Cosmopolitanism” (Mignolo 2000). The starting point was to brazen out “cosmopolitanism” with “globalization.” For, indeed, is not globalization cosopolitan? And, in reverse, is not cosmopolitanism global by definition? It appears then, and in retrospect, that “globalization” was a term introduced in the vocabulary of political theory and political economy when markets were de-regulated and profit was equated with growth. “Globalization” became, in the eighties, the replacement of “development” that invaded the field of political theory and political economies from 1950 to 1975 approximately. But once the theories of Milton Friedman began to take hold, in the late seventies, and were institutionalized by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher in the 80’s, “globalization” was the rhetorical term to describe neoliberal imperial designs in the remaking of global coloniality. Global coloniality, the darker side of global modernity and neoliberal globalization, explains the frequent concern with the fact that during the past quarter of the century, globalization meant also the expansion of the poverty line and the growing divide between the have and have nots. While modernity and globalization promises the paved road to paradise, it hides the dirt and the injustices that are being left on the side and behind the road to paradise. That
hidden side of neoliberal globalization is global coloniality.

Cosmopolitanism was a term re-invigorated by progressive humanists of liberal, postmodern and Marxist bent. However, it run parallel to the discourse of neoliberal globalization promoting the end of nationalism and the beginning of a marvelous borderless world. However, scholars promoting cosmopolitanism were explicitly against neoliberal globalization. But above all, cosmopolitanism was mainly a concern of Western intellectuals and scholars. I did not encounter any interest in Bolivia and Ecuador for example, and I wonder what cosmopolitanism may mean in the Middle East or in Central Asia. Cosmopolitanism like globalism was also unidirectional and centrifugal—both were global designs imagined and discussed within Western Europe and the US for the rest of the world.

Thus, I was asking myself, what is the place of “cosmopolitanism” in the dreary scenario at the end of the twentieth century, if cosmopolitanism seems to run parallel to the goals of neoliberal globalization that scholars promoting globalization are manifestedly against? My response, at the time of writing (late nineties) and its publications (mid 2000), started from Immanuel Kant’s cosmopolitan ideals (and by extension with enlightenment, clear cosmopolitan ambitions) co-existing with his notorious racist underpinning. So, the question was, how could cosmopolitanism be possible when the designer of the project had a hierarchical view of humanity around the planet? It became clear to me then that “cosmopolitanism” was willingly or not a project of Western expansion (that today what we describe as “globalization”, see above) whose implementation was through the “civilizing mission” rather than by free market in economy and democracy in politics. In that regard, Kant’s cosmopolitan ideals where as imperial as late twentieth century’s march through free-trade, military bases and “spreading democracy”, one of the preferred expressions of the politically
defunct ex-President George W. Bush. Although entirely questionable today, that Kant was an honest and true believer.¹)

Once I reached this conclusion I set myself to explore the issue in two directions: one the proper history of cosmopolitan ideas and the other its co-existence with events of parallel histories. I realized that Kant’s cosmopolitanism was co-eval with the declaration of The Rights of Man and of the Citizen, but there were no direct connections between the two series of events — the emergence of cosmopolitan designs and the declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. However, these two historical trajectories would become entangle and undistinguishables in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While cosmopolitanism was a worldly (or global) project, The Rights of Man and of the Citizen was concerned with what would be the modern (and European) nation-states. It doesn’t require much effort to conclude that The Rights of Man and of the Citizen in France and by extension in England and Germany, were one piece in the complex transformation of monarchies into modern nation-states. Thus, although there is no invocation to the Rights of Man and of Citizen in Kant’s cosmopolitan ideal (since he had plenty of time to reflect on since the Declaration in 17809 and his death in 1804), the Declaration would become — directly or indirectly — linked to cosmopolitan projects. How come?

If The Rights of Man and of the Citizen in Europe were to warranty the civil security of Man (let’s say, of human beings) and that the civil security of Man was tied up to citizenship, then The Rights worked in two complementary directions. One was chronological as The Rights of Man and of the Citizen necessary to secure the life of the citizens under secular rule of govern

¹) See the recent volume co-edited by Stuart Elden and Eduardo Mendieta, Reading Kant’s Geography (Albay: SUNY University Press, 2011).
mentality within the history of Europe itself. The other was geographical, as The Rights will become the measuring stick to judge social behavior that, according to Western standards, are un-civilized and, therefore, violates the rights of Man outside Europe. The silent assumption was that there was no violation of the rights of citizens, because there was no such social role outside Europe. Thus, the civilizing mission and cosmopolitanism appeared to be the underlying project of secular Western expansion.

9/11, 2001 was the first wake-up call and not only for globalization but for cosmopolitanism as well. It was perhaps the first global event that put a halt to the dreams of Kantian cosmopolitanism; but also revealed the imperial underpinning of the Kantian vision and legacy.

1.2.

“Cosmopolitanism” was a buzzword in the late nineties and continues to be in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Why such wide spread interest in “cosmopolitanism?”

I see four main motivations:

1) One was the previous wide spread concerns and limits of “national thinking.” Nationalism was what cosmopolitanism was trying to overcome. Cross-cultural and planetary dialogues were argued as ways toward the future, instead of leaping to defend and enclose the borders of the nations. Immigration contributed to the surge of cosmopolitanism. Nationalists saw immigration as a problem; cosmopolitans as an opening toward global futures;

2) The second motivation was the need to build arguments that, moving away from nationalism, did not fall into the hands of neo-liberal and economic globalization. That kind of global world was not what cosmopolitans liked to
support at the end of the twentieth century. Thus, one of the strands of cosmopolitan thinking, confronting globalization, was caught in between honest liberalism opposed to neo-liberal globalization and a renovated Marxism that saw new global players invited to think cosmopolitanism beyond the international proletarian revolution;

3) A third motivation, related to the first two, was to move away from closed and monocultural conceptions of identity supporting State designs to control the population by celebrating multiculturalism. At this level, cosmopolitanism focused on the individual: the person was invited to see herself as an open citizen of the world, embodying several “identities.” In a word, it was a liberal conception of cosmopolitanism born out of dissent simultaneous with the formation in Europe of the modern nation-states. That legacy has been translated into an ideal of flexible and open cultural citizenship simultaneous with the process of neo-liberal globalization.

4) The fourth motivation, compatible but also distinct from the second, was the legal proposal putting on the agenda “cosmopolitanism from below,” that was eventually connected with the agenda of the World Social Forum;

II.

In his lectures on *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (published toward the end of his life, [Kant 1996]), Kant brought cosmopolitanism in the section devoted to the “characters of the species.” The characters of the species, in relation to his cosmopolitan ideas and ideals, shall be understood in relation to two preceding sections: “the character of the nations” and the “character of races.” The characters of the nations are limited to six European nations: France, England and Germany in the first round; Italy, Spain and Portugal in the
second round. Kant arrives at the frontier of “nations” encloses this section stressing its limits:

Since Russia has not yet developed definite characteristics from its natural potential; since Poland has no longer any characteristics; and since the nationals of European Turkey never have had a character, nor will ever attain what is necessary for a definite national character, the description of these nations’ characters may properly be passed over here. 2)

Kant then moves to the “character of races”, which is a short section in which “nature” takes the place of “nations” in the previous section. Kant delimits the question of races by focusing instead on “the character of species.” And in this section the character of the species “human” (of the race animals), deserves close scrutiny. Cosmopolitanism then comes into the picture in the section “basic features concerning the description of the Human Species’ Characters.” And here is how Kant’s envisioned cosmopolitanism, quoted at length:

The human race taken collectively (as the entire human species) is a great number of people living successively and simultaneously. They cannot be without peaceful co-existence, and yet they cannot avoid continuous disagreement with one another. Consequently, they feel destined by nature to develop, through mutual compulsion and laws written by them, into a cosmopolitan society (cosmopolitanisms) which is constantly threatened by dissension but generally progressing toward a coalition.

The cosmopolitan society is in itself an unreachable idea, but it is not a constitutive principle (which is expectant of peace amidst the most vigorous actions and reactions of men). It is only a regulative principle demanding that we yield generously to the cosmopolitan society as the destiny of the human

2) Kant, op. cit., p. 235.
race; and this not without reasonable ground for supposition that there is a natural inclination in this direction. 3)

The idea and the horizon of a cosmopolitan society is predicated, by Kant, on the bases of a previous consideration he has established between freedom and law, the two pivots or pillars of any civil legislation: “If authority is combined with freedom and law, the principles of freedom and law are ensured with success.” 4) And he considers four conceivable combinations of authority with freedom and law:

1) Law and freedom without authority (anarchy);
2) Law and authority without freedom (despotism);
3) Authority without freedom and law (barbarism)
4) Authority, with freedom and law (republic) 5)

Needless to say, Kant privileges the last one. And, therefore, cosmopolitan ideals presuppose the republican organization of society in which authority goes hand in hand with freedom and law. As Kant himself recognizes it, cosmopolitanism is an idea which may become despotic and anarchic if authority with freedom and law in place A (say Germany) is considered the ideal of social organization for in other places, say, B or G (say Korea or Bolivia). And this was precisely the presuppositions underlying Kant’s ideals envisaging a global order he conceived as cosmopolitan.

III.

There is still another aspect we shall bring to the foreground to understand the implications of a cosmopolitan social order that were put forward in the

3) Kant, op. cit., p. 249, bold added.
4) Kant, op. cit., p. 248.
5) Ibid.
eighteenth century.

In his landmark book Cosmopolis. The Hidden Agenda of Modernity, Stephen Toulmin (Toulmin 1990) brought the idea of a cosmo-polis into new light — cosmo-polis a significant aspect of the hidden agenda of modernity. Why the hidden agenda? What motivated Toulmin to write this book was the moment when he understood that the image of modernity he had learned in England in the decades of the 1930s and 1940s, were faulty, partial and overtly celebratory. Toulmin uncovers two dimensions of the idealistic and triumphal image of modernity ingrained mainly in protestant Europe. One is that the seventeenth century, far from being a golden age of Europe that prompted the advent of science and philosophy, it was a moment of economic crisis marked by the decay of the Spanish empire and the not-yet flourishing of a new imperial era. Holland was enjoying a moment of commercial glory but Western Christians were killing each other in the Thirty Years Religious War. The second aspect underlined by Toulmin, prompted by his early reading of Michel de Montaigne’s Essais, was to the humanistic tradition (that is, not just the advent of modern science and secular philosophy with Galileo, Bacon and Descartes), but the humanistic tradition initiated during the European Renaissance breaking away from the theological and epistemological control of the Church and the Papacy. That, in a nutshell, is the hidden agenda of modernity and cosmopolis appears, in Toulmin’s argument in that humanistic vein, although of course, mixed with scientific models of the world. Precisely, cosmo-polis or the polis (society) organized following the model of the cosmos that physics and astronomy were making available at the time.

Thus, Toulmin adumbrates the issue in the following manner: We are here concerned, not with “science” as the modern positivists understand it, but with a cosmopolis that gives a comprehensive account of the world, so as to bind
things together in “politico-theological”, as much as in scientific or explanatory, terms.6)

Toulmin explains that the reconstruction of European society after the Thirty Years’ War was based on two pillars or principles: stability and hierarchy. Stability applied to inter-relations among sovereign nations. Sovereign nations were a conception in the mind of European thinkers (like Kant, for example), and it applied to the very society in which they were dwelling and thinking. Thus, beyond the realm of sovereign nations (which were basically the six modern and imperial European nations (Germany, England, France, Spain, Italy and Portugal, with Holland interregnum).7) The imperial question was not in the picture of stable relations among sovereign nations in the process of becoming states. Hierarchy applied to the internal organization of society or within the internal organization of each individual state. But, again, the presupposed totality was that of the six or seven Western European countries.

Toulmin further explains — and reminds us — that by 1700 social relations (hierarchy) within nation-states were defined horizontally based on super-ordination and subordination of class relations: “Social stability depended on all the parties in society ‘knowing their place’ relative to the others, and knowing what reciprocal modes of behavior were appropriate and rational.”8) The planetary model of society was based on the hierarchical relations within nation-states and it was, Toulmin observes, “explicitly cosmopolitical.” How come?

Without such a justification — Toulmin observes — the imposition of hierarchy on ‘the lower orders’ by ‘the better sort’ of people would be arbitrary

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6) Toulmin, op. cit., p. 128.
7) Holland had a flourishing commercial interregnum in the seventeenth century, but Dutch is not one of the top 10 languages with the larger number of speakers. Portuguese is in seven places, above Italian and French and below Arabic and Bengali.
8) Toulmin, op. cit., p. 133.
and self-serving. *To the extend that this hierarchy mirrored the structure of nature*, its *authority* was self-explanatory, self-justifying and seemingly rational.9)

Here we encounter *authority* and *law* (posited by Kant), but not yet *freedom*. Let’s take one step further and see how the *polis* can be organized following the model of the *cosmos*. In this light we understand that the undisclosed assumption was that:

a) The *hierarchical organization* of each nation (*polis*) state shall follow the model provided by the law of the *cosmos*;

b) The *stability relations* among nation states shall also be modeled on the law of nature (*cosmos*) that serves the model for the organization of each state within itself (*polis*).

Thus, Toulmin puts it this way: The philosophical belief that nature obeys mathematical “laws” which will ensure its stability for so long as it pleases God to maintain it, was a socially revolutionary idea: both *cosmos* and *polis* (it appeared) were self-contained, and their joint ‘rationality’ guaranteed their stability. As recently as 1650, people worried that the World was grinding to its End: by 1720, their grand children were confident that a rational and omniscient Creator had made a world that ran perfectly.10)

The idea was shortly after that (by 1776) applied to the economy and the belief took hold that economic transactions were guided by an “invisible hand” which, like God or Nature, regulated and balanced the field of forces. This idea lasted until the Fall of 2008 when Wall Street exploded blowing off the fingers of the invisible hands and depriving it from playing the strings and guiding the marionettes.

10) Ibid.
IV.

If *cosmopolitan* ideals shall be maintained *in* and *for* the twenty-first century, *cosmopolitanism* shall be accountable for its crimes: the very foundation of *cosmopolitanism* as envisioned by Kant and explained by Toulmin, was in complicity with the formation of European imperial powers and of European expansion in America, Africa and Asia as well as with the continuation of Europe in the United States, as Hegel was anticipating.\(^\text{11)}\) To maintain *cosmopolitan ideals* we (all those who engage in this project) have to decolonize cosmopolitanism which means moving toward a de-colonial cosmopolitan order no longer modeled on the law of nature discovered by science. *Decolonial cosmopolitanism* shall be the *becoming of a pluri-versal* world order built upon and dwelling on the global borders of modernity/coloniality. In what follows I explain this idea. I will proceed by taking a step back from the seventeenth century, where Toulmin learned that “modernity” planted its seed. I will trace back the sowing of that seed during the European Renaissance, the period and location Toulmin discovered humanism as modernity’s hidden agenda beyond the celebration of science and secular philosophy. Then I will take a step forward and reflect on the formation of United States, when massive immigration from Europe agitated the quite waters of two centuries of Pilgrim’s pro-creation, of Native American repression and enslaved African exploitation.

IV.1.

About one hundred and thirty years before Immanuel Kant pronounced his lecture on anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (1772-1773), the need

\(^{11)}\) Crimes that have been covered in velvet and shoveled out of the main stream, by the beautifully written and well advertised essay *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* by Kwame Anthony Appiah (2006).
of international law emerged in the consciousness of Western Christians. While in Europe the Trent’s Council was setting the stage for a bloody scenario that will consume Western Christian Europe until the Peace of Westphalia (1648) ending both the Thirty Years’ War that piggy-backed on the eighty years war between Spain and the Netherlands, legal theologians at the University of Salamanca were starting their long journey to solve two interrelated problems: to what extent Indians in the New World were Human and to what extent, as a consequence, they have property rights. Far from the mind of Castilian was to just think for a minute that property rights was not universal, and that in the Inca and Aztec civilizations, as well as in other existing communities in the Caribbean, natives do not relate to land as property by as Mother Earth (Pachamama, was the name in Aymara and Quechua, and Gaia the name in Ancient Greece). To understand that Pachamama or Gaia is the energy thanks to which live on earth is possible, is not a myth of fantasy. It is just common sense. To see instead only “land” and “natural resources” as commodity is not common sense but the alienation of a civilization built on the idea of private property, including what Pachamama and Gaia generate. Francisco de Vitoria, and his followers were confronting, during the second half of the sixteenth century, issues of a history parallel to and intertwined with the internal history of Europe that Kant framed in terms of nation-state and national characters. This double history, its imperial and colonial side, were certainly at work in the seventeenth century, but as Toulmin has elegantly narrated in the first chapter of his book, only the bright side of imperial European history was transmitted to his generation, in England, in the 1930s and 1940s.

Dwelling in a secular era, Kant revamped the Greek word *cosmopolis* and gave it a different meaning. Greek philosophers where not thinking next to modern science, Christian religious war and modern imperial colonialism. Greek *cosmopolis*
has more in common with Quechua-Aymara *Tawantinsuyu* (the world [cosmos and the city] organized in four *suyus* or sections) than with Kant’s *cosmo-polis*. However, one could surmise that *Tawantinsuyu* could have served equally well to imagine a global and social organization of the Human species. And, as a matter of fact, Guaman Poma de Ayala did exactly that 250 years before Kant when he laid out his *Nueva Corónica y Buen Gobierno* and proposed to Philip III an organization of “The Indies of the New World” (as Guaman Poma de Ayala referred to the mixed co-existence of Inca and Spanish rule in the Viceroyalty of Perú and the Inca Tawantinsuyu). The organization of the first imperial/colonial society since the sixteenth century meant to solve a cosmo-political problem of a particular kind: the formation of modern/colonial inter-state relations and inner-state social organization (stability and hierarchy).

Toward the end of sixteenth century, that is, merely fifty years from the moment Spaniards were able to gain control of Tawantinsuyu and began to build the Viceroyalty of Peru, was not too much time to figure out what to do in a new situation in the history of human kind. Guaman Poma knew his own history and the history of the world he read in Spanish authors, mainly those writing on the New World. The internal organization of Tawantinsuyu he solved by giving one *suyu* to each of the existing ethnicities at his time: Spaniards, Indians, Moors and Blacks. On the other hand, the world was remapped according to Tawantinsuyu: he drew a map then divided it into two parts. On the upper part he located Tawantinsuyu and in the lower part Spain. However, Spaniards did not see themselves below Tawantinsuyu and they prevailed. Prevailing, however, did not mean that the forces of history were killed forever. The current process of re-writing the Constitution in Bolivia and

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12) Guaman Poma de Ayala, *Nueva Corónica y buen Gobierno* was finished in 1516, presumably composed in a period of two decades. See Ayala (1985).
Ecuador, and the entire discussion on the pluri-national state is nothing else than the continuation of the problem Guaman Poma saw emerging five hundred years ago when the territory of Incas and Aymaras became a mix of ethnicities. His de-colonial political treatise was and remains exemplar: he did not propose to co-exist with the *enemy*. On the contrary, the very idea of the *enemy* was not in his mind. Thus, one of the first steps of decolonial cosmopolitanism is to get rid of the idea of *friends* and *enemies* in which *the political* finds its raison-d’être. Carl Schmitt’s proposal only makes sense with European “political theology” and “the idea of the political” that is, in the secularization of Christian theology in which, Christian theology, the world was already divided between Christianity and “those barbarians who hate it and want to destroy it.” — In other words, for Schmitt “political theology” emerged from the complicity between the theological structure of Christianity and its mutation into Secular Reason in the eighteenth century.\(^{13}\) And the “idea of the political” conceived in terms of friends and foes, presupposed the ideological frame of European history. For a colonial subject, all that is new and strange: Christianity and Secularism where ideologies that came from afar to disrupt the internal ideological frame, that is, the ideological frame of Andean Civilization and not of Western Civilization. So, the “decolonial political”, if we want to frame it this way, has to confront the “imperial political” conceived in terms of foes and friends. Certainly I am working on an anachronism here. Guaman Poma lived in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, while Schmitt’s proposals were advanced in the twentieth century. However, we will commit a different kind of anachronism if we try to read Guaman Poma as if nothing happened since then. More so, when today the “decolonial political” has to make an intervention

on the dominant and partial European debates on Schmitt’s ideas, from the left and from the right.

The problem is not minor, and the whole idea of de-colonial cosmopolitanism is at stake.

IV.2.

“Cosmopolitanism” was not a term in use in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The “idea” however was there in theological, rather than secular terms. Kant’s conception of cosmo-polis presupposed the already existing “typus orbis terrarum” mapped by Abraham Ortelius in 1570. In other words, “cosmopolitanism” in the eighteenth century (in the sense of a human polis modeled on the law of the cosmos) is the secular version of a word that did not exist but that we can invent: “Christianism”. Christianism did not image society regulated by the law of the universe (quite the contrary, Christianity was against scientific discoveries — as we know through Galileo’s trial — but none the less imagined a society modeled according to Christian views of divine and natural laws. In the last analysis, it was the same: secular thinkers who dethroned God and replaced it by Science and Reason and placed themselves in the driver’s seat of civilization. So, let’s go back in search of the Christian version (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) and foundation of secular cosmopolitanism (eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).

The concept of “good governance” recently entered the vocabulary of international relations and international law. Paradoxically the term is not used in the sense proposed by Guaman Poma; and even less in the sense the Zapatistas in Southern Mexico use the term (“Juntas de Buen Gobierno”.

14) See Abraham Ortelius’s world map (Ortelius, 1570).
“Council of Good Governance”), but in the implied version elaborated by legal theologians of Salamanca. Thus, there is a direct line connecting the emergence of international law in the sixteenth century (there is no such a thing before then) with cosmopolitan ideals in the eighteenth century and with good governance and development in the twentieth century promoted by the United Nations and the World Bank. Not by chance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, in 1948, came at the time in which such institutions were being created and, therefore, Human Rights, good governance and development began to work in tandem toward the new version of “Christianism” and “cosmopolitanism” now baptized as “globalism.” “Globalism” like “cosmopolitanism” names a vision rather than a process (e.g. globalization). Interestingly enough, what words highlight and hide is different in the three successive and now coexisting imperial projects. Christianization and globalization are accepted words. However, cosmopolitanization is not accepted by Thesaurus; which doesn’t accept “Christianism” either.

The continuity from the sixteenth to the twenty-first century, that is, the formation, consolidation and expansion of Western ideals and civilizations, is one of the central theses of the project modernity/coloniality (Grosfoguel 2008). The theses is the following: the process of governing the Indies, managing the riches and controlling the population forced Spaniard and Portuguese first, then British, French and German intellectuals, merchants and officers of the State to invent both discourses and managerial technologies that introduced transformations of scale in relation to previous technologies of control, in Europe, and introduced others unknown until then. The end result was the formation, along the sixteenth century, of the colonial matrix of power.

The colonial matrix of power has been described in four interrelated domains of practices and arguments (as well as laws, edicts, institutions, implicit and explicit assumptions):
1) The management of control of subjectivities emerged first in the Spanish encounter with natives. The church and the monastic orders, took over the management and control of subjectivities by converting Indians to Christianity and teaching them Spanish and also by controlling the Spanish and Portuguese population, and their descendants, in the formation of colonial societies;

2) The control of authority, shared between the papacy and the monarchy, was established by a series of law and edits, such as El Tratado de Tordesillas (1394) by which the Pope donated the Americas to Spanish and Portuguese monarchs; by the infamous Requerimiento, by which Spaniards gave themselves the right to expropriate lands and by the establishments of Viceroyalties from Mexico to Peru and the River Plate. International law came about as a need to regulate the interactions between European foreigners and native Indians.

3) The control of economy was organized first around the exploitations of mines and the creation of *encomiendas*, by means of which Spaniards obtained lands and Indians to work on it. Late on, plantations in the Caribbean accelerated the slave trade and the exploitation of labor. By the end of seventeenth century, economy engendered a set of discourse that will engender, in the eighteenth century, the emergence of political economy;

4) The control of knowledge was managed by several means. First of all the already existing printing press that allowed Europeans to publish and circulate reports, narratives, treatises, debates, about the New World. Indians did not have the same possibility and therefore whatever they said and thought was either unheard or if it was heard it was through Iberian first then French and British travelers, historians or philosophers in later centuries. And the same happened with millions of enslaved Africans transported to the New World, and with Africans in Africa who did not have any say in the debate, until late in the eighteenth century when ex-enslaved had the opportunity to write and be
published. And secondly, the control of knowledge was managed through the installation of colleges, monasteries, and universities.

These four domains are all and constantly interrelated and held together by the two pillars of enunciation: the racial and patriarchal foundation of knowledge without which the colonial matrix of power would not have been possible to be established. Racism and patriarchy took the form of Christian theology (regardless of whether Catholic or Protestant principles are defended or critiqued) and manifested itself in the theo-politic of knowledge. Since the eighteenth century, secular science of philosophy (regardless of whether different schools of thought confronted each other) displaced (but did not replaced) theo-logy and grounded itself in secular reason and ego-logy. When France and England, for example, displaced Spain and Portugal in the leadership (or when the United States displaced England after WWII), the colonial matrix of power was transformed and adapted to the new circumstances, but the basic principles in the control of knowledge remained. Another story appears when, for example, the confrontation is not between England and Spain but between all the Western Christian countries of the Atlantic and Islamic countries of the Middle East. In the former case, the dispute was and still is for the control of the colonial matrix of power. In the second case the confrontation is between countries, agents and institutions that built and controlled the colonial matrix and countries, agents and institutions that were destined to be controlled by it. Thus, “good governance” meant imperial management of authority and control of knowledge directly related to good governance. International law sprang out of the necessity to justify the control of Indians and justify the expropriation of their lands.
IV.3.

Francisco de Vitoria was celebrated mainly among Spanish and other European scholars for being one of the founders of international law. His treatise, *Relectio de Indis* is considered foundational (Vitoria 1532). The idea of the *Orbis Christianus* (or the Christian cosmos) was not new. It was the legacy of the Roman Empire; particularly from the moment Constantine brought together Christianity with *Imperium* (e.g. dominium), to which later on England will claim their own inheritance and more recently, the United States. The novelty of the sixteenth century was the emergence of a part of humanity (named Indians by Christians) and lands (named Indias Occidentales, New World and later on America). The historical and colonial foundation of international law was at the same time the foundation of *rights and racism*, as we know it today. Let’s see how.

Central in Vitoria’s argument is the question of *ius gentium* (rights of the people or rights of nations). At Vitoria’s time a distinction was made between divine, human and natural law. By divine law the Pope was the ultimate sovereign, above the monarch — more precisely between God and the monarch. Vitoria was a humanist and he rejected divine law. Nations, that is, communities of people, were bound by natural law and therefore they all have the rights of the people. Thus, there was no difference for Vitoria between Spaniards and Indians in regard to *ius gentium*. The problem appeared when he had to find a reason to legally authorize Spaniards to take possession of Indian lands. Vitoria found its way out by recognizing the Indians are human but they “lack” something. Lack and excesses were two constant features of Indians, as well as non-Christians, to locate their correspondence with the standard model of humanity. Thus, although bound and equal to Spaniards in the domain of *ius gentium*, Indians were sort of childish and needed the guidance and protection
of Spaniards.

At that moment Vitoria inserted the colonial difference into international law. *Orbis Christianus* encountered its limits; limits that will remain when secular cosmopolitanism recast the imperial project and set the stage for the civilizing mission. Anthony Anghie has provided an insightful analysis of the historical foundational moment of the colonial difference.\(^\text{15}\) In a nutshell the argument is the following, Indians and Spaniards are equal in the face of natural law as both, by natural law, are endowed with *ius gentium*. In making this move, Vitoria prevented the Pope and divine law from legislating on human issues. That is, it deprived the Pope of its sovereignty. Natural law endows the monarch and the state as sovereign. The question now is whether Indians who, like Spaniards, are endowed with *ius gentium* by natural (and not divine), law are sovereigns. If they are sovereigns, then wars with Indians will be ruled by international law legislating between two sovereign states. Vitoria's foundational move consisted in this:

By bracketing divine law and putting the Pope out of legislation of human affairs, he established natural law as the ultimate sovereign. Society shall be governed according to natural law and, at the time where science (astronomy and physics) where in its inception and not on good terms with theology, the interpretation of natural law was in the hands of legal theologians, like Vitoria himself. Now, by natural law all human beings were born equal—a principle to which no one will object—and because of it are all endowed with *ius gentium*, with the rights of people or nations. Vitoria devoted the first two of the three sections of *Relection de Indis*, to defend the rights of Indians (to whom he consistently refers to as “los barbaros”, “the barbarians”) not to be dispossessed or invaded, and put a halt to Spaniards anxiety to invade and disposes.

\(^{15}\) On the topic, see Anghie (1999), Mignolo (2000), and Welk (2007).
However, once Vitoria established the distinction between “principes Christianos” (and Castilian in general) and “los bárbaros” (the barbarians) on the other, and he made his best effort to balance his arguments based on the equality he attributed to both people by natural law and *ius gentium*, the entire discussion is based on Spaniards *rights and limits* toward “the barbarians” to expropriate or not; to declare war or not; to govern or not. Vitoria offers frequently counter or parallel examples imagining what would happen if instead of Christians and barbarians, the situation would be between French and Castilians without calling attention to the difference. The difference is communication and interactions between French and Castilians are established on the assumption of two sovereign nations or people, in which case in any litigation both parties will have a saying. On the contrary, communication and interactions between Christians and barbarians are one-sided: *the barbarians have no saying in whatever Vitoria said because barbarians are deprived from sovereignty even when they are recognized as equal per natural law and ius gentium*.

The move is foundational in the legal and philosophical constitution of the modern/colonial world and will be maintained through the centuries, modified in the vocabulary from barbarians to primitives, from primitives to communists, from communists to terrorists. The overall logic that links the mutation in the vocabulary needed in different times and circumstances, and that justifies to expel to the outside all elements that are undesirable or dangerous to maintain the inside, could be summarized on the concept of *humanitas* (the self conception of those who control knowledge and discourses) and *anthropos* (the consequences of the colonial difference through which the undesirable and dangerous are classified).16) Thus *orbis christianus*, secular cosmopolitanism and economic globalism

are names corresponding to different moments of the colonial matrix of power and distinct imperial leadership (from Spain to England to the United States). These are the many-faces of cosmo-polis I outlined in my previous article taking the question of rights (of people, of man and of the citizen and of human) to flag the limits of imperial cosmopolitan projects.

Anthony Anghie made two decisive points about Vitoria and the historical origins of international law: My argument, then, is that Vitoria is concerned, not so much with the problem of order among sovereign states but the problem of order among societies belonging to two different cultural systems. Vitoria resolves this problem by focusing on the cultural practices of each society and assessing them in terms of universal law of *jus gentium*. Once this framework is established, he demonstrates that the Indians (e.g. barbarians in Vitoria’s vocabulary) are in violation of universal natural law. Indians are included within a system only to be disciplined. 17)

Three limits to cosmopolitan ideals (from Orbis Christianus to globalism) deserve attention. The first is that the distinction between two cultural systems has not been proposed by Indians (or barbarians), but by Vitoria unilaterally. Unilateralism in this particular case means that the colonial difference was inscribed in the apparent equality between two cultures or nations endowed by natural law with *ius gentium*. The colonial difference was mainly and foremost epistemological. That is, by recognizing equality by birth and by natural law, Spaniards and barbarians are ontologically equals. However, epistemically, barbarians are not yet ready to govern themselves according to the standards established by human law. And here is where Vitoria’s distinction between divine, natural and human law pays its dividends.

The second is that the framework is there to regulate its violation. And when the violation occurs, then the creator and enforcers of the framework had

17) Anghie, *op. cit.*, p. 102, emphasis added.
This logic was wonderfully rehearsed by John Locke in his *Second Treatise on Government* (1681). One can say that “coloniality”, in Vitoria, set the stage not only for international law but also for “modern and European” conceptions of governmentality. It seems obvious that Locke did not get as much from Machiavelli as from the emergence of international law in the sixteenth century, and in the way that Vitoria, and his followers, settled to discuss both the question of “property” and “governance” in the interaction between Christians and the barbarians. Machiavelli was thinking politically in the conflicted Italy of the first half of the sixteenth century. His concern was to advise the Prince as how to obtain or maintain power and how to regulate conflict, in Italy not between Spaniards and the barbarians! So, for Machiavelli there was no “thief”, like in Locke, or violators of natural law, like in Vitoria.

The third is that the “framework” is not dictated by divine or natural law but by human interests, and in this case, the interests of Christian Castilian males. Thus, the “framework” presupposes a very well located and singular locus of enunciation that, guarded by divine and natural law, it is presumed to be uni-versal. And third, the uni-versal and uni-lateral frame “includes” the barbarians or Indians (a principle that is valid for all politics of inclusion we hear today) in their difference thus justifying any action Christians will take to tame them. The construction of the *colonial difference* goes hand in hand with the establishment of *exteriority*: the invented place outside the frame (barbarians) that is brought into the frame in order to secure the control of the frame (civilized) and to legislate. Exteriority in other words, is the outside invented in the process of building the inside. In order to do so, you have to control the enunciation both institutional and conceptually.

Anghie made a second single observation that coincides with one of the
basic principles upon which de-colonial thinking and the analytic of modernity/coloniality has been built: Clearly, then, Vitoria’s work suggests that the conventional view that sovereignty doctrine was developed in the West and then transferred to the non-European world is, in important respects, misleading. *Sovereignty doctrine acquired its character through the colonial encounter.* This is the darker history of sovereignty, which cannot be understood by any account of the doctrine that assumes the exists of sovereign states.18)

Anghie points toward a radical epistemic shift necessary to de-colonize the inherited view of Eurocentered modernity. That is, that international relations based on the concept of sovereignty emerged in Europe, after the Peace of Westphalia, to regulate an emerging inter-state system, within Europe were states were considered sovereign. This is the local and regional situation in which Kant was thinking cosmopolitism. But beyond the heart of Europe as we saw above, when Kant faces Russia, Turkey and Poland, what he faces is indeed the *colonial difference.* And the *colonial difference,* at the time of Kant, was refashioned in two complementary directions:

1) Orientalism, as analyzed by Edward Said, was nothing else other than updating the colonial difference of secular Europe with the Orient, that Vitoria had already established Christian Europe and the barbarians.

2) The invention of the South of Europe (clear in Kant and Hegel), recast the colonial difference into *internal imperial difference.* the emerging imperial countries (England, Germany, France, now leading the European Union), separated themselves from Christian and Latin countries (France occupying an intermediary position, but also taking the leadership of the Southern Latin countries – Italy, Spain and Portugal).

Kant’s cosmopolitanism was cast under the implicit assumptions that beyond

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the heart of Europe was the land of those who had to be brought into
civilization and, in the South of Europe, the Latin and Catholic countries, some
of them — like Spain and Portugal — to close to the Moors and with mixed
blood.

Now, if we jump from the era of European “cosmopolitan” modernity and
the civilizing mission (with England and France leading the way) to a post-modern
world guided by “globalism” we have the sketch of the continuity and
diachronic accumulation of the rhetoric of modernity (salvation, conviviality,
prosperity and freedom) and its darker side, the logic of coloniality (discrimination,
racism, domination, unilateralism, exploitation). What is “globalism”? Manfred
Steger introduced suggestions that globalism — is “an Anglo-American market
ideology that reached its zenith in the 1990s — was inextricably linked to the
rising fortunes of neoliberal political forces in the world’s sole remaining superpower
(Steger (2005), p. 12). It is anchored in neo-liberalism, a doctrine associated with the
ideas developed after WWII by Hayek and Milton Friedman — in radical
confrontation with state-regulated economy of the Soviet Union — implemented by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher and brought to their
disastrous consequences by the spectacular collapse of Wall Street in
September-October 2008. The extreme interest of globalism, in relation to the
previous periods of theological international law and secular state and inter-state
regulations after Westphalia (Locke, Kant), is that while the first (orbis
Christianus) has Christian theology (divine, natural and human law) as the
overarching frame and the second (secular cosmopolitanism) had secular
philosophy and science (the physical law of the cosmos unveiled by from
Copernicus and Galileo to Newton) to regulate society and imagine a
cosmopolitan world, the third (globalism), had an “invisible hand” regulating
economy. The “invisible hand” introduced by Adam Smith — during the same
years that Kant was imagining cosmopolitanism and conviviality — as regulator of economic transactions, always had for me a hidden complicity with Vitoria (and Christian) divine and natural laws.

Thus, when we move from “good governance” in the sense Vitoria and Locke imagined it (the first through international law, the second regulation national-state), to globalism, we put *bonmo economicus* in front row (instead of Christian and civilized confronting the barbarians) and the underdeveloped at the other end. At this point “barbarians” of all kinds loose their appeal and their forces: globalism is not so much concerned with taming the barbarians and in the legality of international relations, but in reducing costs and increasing gains. Thus, barbarians were replaced by “communists” first and by “terrorists” later: the forces that prevent *bonmo economicus* become global.

Questions related to the nature of humanity, of who is human or less human and who is more, looses their relevance. What counts are people who can work and consume disregard their religious belief, their skin color or their sexuality. “Globalism” is the global sharing of a particular type of economy disregarding, once again, if the leader of that economy are Saudi Arabians, Indonesian Muslim, Hindu Indians, Orthodox and Slavic Russians or White and Christian French, British and Anglo-Americans. Orbis Christianus, Cosmopolitanism and Globalism are then different versions in the long history of Western imperial expansion. To the point, today, of having loosened the grip it had on the colonial matrix of power under dispute.

V.

Decolonial cosmopolitanism proposes a double departure, a radical shift in the geopolitics of knowing and being. The scenarios in which decolonial cosmopolitanism
could be thought out and ac the following:

1. The transformation of the mono-centric (and uni-lateral) Western world from sixteenth century establishment of the colonial matrix of power to 2000. In that period, the colonial matrix of power we created, consolidated, augmented and controlled by Western imperialism (Spain, England, United States basically). Since 2000, approximately, the colonial matrix of power is under dispute. We are witnessing the transformation of a mono-centric to a poly-centric world sharing the same type of economy, capitalist of economy. However, poly-centricity appears at the level of control of political authority, control of knowledge and control of subjectivity (e.g. gender, sexuality, religiosity etc.). At the moment of writing this article, the meeting of the G20 is taking place in Washington to fix the Wall Street disaster. However, while the G20 would agree on many points regarding economy, there is no question that China and the United States, India and Brazil, Saudi Arabia and Germany etc., would have contentions in other arenas, from political to epistemic and religious issues. Furthermore, countries like Iran and Venezuela, economically powerful and capitalist, are not part of the G20 precisely because contentions are played out in the domain of controlling authority, subjectivity and knowledge.

2. A polycentric capitalist world is not of course a decolonial world: a world that has dispensed with the colonial matrix of power and the colonial and imperial differences regulating the field of forces in the modern/colonial world. De-colonial cosmopolitanism is not so much (yet) thought out and activated in the sphere of the State (perhaps with exceptions like the government of Evo Morales in Bolivia, which by 2011 is becoming a leftist government supporting development ideals and highway building through the Amazon and going against Indigenous’s protests and defense of “the right of nature” or the right of Pachamama), but in the domain of what Partha Chatterjee describes as
“political society” (Chaterjee (2004), pp. 27-52). That is, the sphere of the “civil society” described by Hegel in the framework of liberal cosmopolitanism and secular order of society has been expanded, mainly in the twentieth century, by the irruption and disruption of the “political society” part of which is described as “social movements.” The decolonial global political society is truly the third power, next to economic institutions and state institutions, while the liberal civil society remains within the modern conception of live, government and society. With the opening move of the Bandung Conference (1955) and its follow up with the Conference of Non-Aligned Countries (1961), decolonial projects reject both capitalism and communism, both offspring of the European enlightenment and therefore complicit with Western imperial expansionism. Decolonial horizons went through radical transformations in the past half a century, and today decoloniality focuses more in decolonizing knowledge and being in order to imagine non-capitalist economies and non-imperialist political theories. One of those radical transformations consists in the emergence of the global political society — social organizations that stop believing that within the cosmology of the modern state or the capitalist market, the problems that have been created by believing and acting in Western cosmology will be solved within the same logic that created them.

Decolonial cosmopolitanism shall be placed in the sphere of the political society, although not necessarily the entire sphere of political society would be de-colonial. De-colonial projects and de-colonial cosmopolitanism are defined in relation to the definition of coloniality, that is, of the formation and transformation of the colonial matrix of power as described above.

De-colonial cosmopolitanism dwells in the borders, in exteriority, in the colonial difference. While cosmopolitanism in its different versions (orbis Christianus, globalism), were concocted and enacted in and from the “center” (that is, in
the heart of Western imperial countries and histories), de-colonial cosmopolitanism is a proposal from the “margins”. The margins are places, histories, people whom non-being Christian and secular Europeans, without dwelling in that particular history, were forced to deal with it, from the “barbarian Indians” and enslaved Africans in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, to China and India in the nineteenth century, Iran and Iraq in the twentieth, since oil was discovered. I am not saying that all Indians and Afro-descendants in America, Chinese and Indians, Iranians and Iraqis will get up and rise in arms, harmoniously and unified against the evil forces of Western modernity. I am just saying that de-colonial projects are emerge from colonial modernities, that is, non-European subjects who had to deal with European modernity in spite of themselves. Inhabitants of colonial modernities have an array of options. In one extreme, there is the assimilating option and the contribution to Westernization of their backward countries. The other is enrolling and adapting Marxism to detach from European modernity and capitalism. Another would be to enroll in theologies of liberations, in places where theology entered mainly as an imperial force. And still another will be the de-colonial option. The de-colonial option starts from narrating a silenced history, the history of the formation and transformation of the colonial matrix of power.

The de-colonial option is the connector, the spine of de-colonial cosmopolitanism, the links between the commonality of colonial experiences between people with uncommon local histories — Indians in India and Indigenous in America, New Zealand and Australia; Chinese struck by the Opium War and by neo-liberalism and the legacies of Maoism in struggles of liberations. In sum, de-colonial cosmopolitanism is the cosmopolitanism that emerges from the de-colonial option and cut across — at the same time that respects — identities in life and politics: all human beings confronting — at different scales — the
consequences of modern/colonial racism and patriarchy have something in common, beyond their religious, ethnic, gender, sexuality, nationalities, languages. Frantz Fanon had a name for them/us: les damnés de la terre. The de-colonial option materializes in multiple trajectories where identities emerge. But, beyond identities, the commonality than identify peoples and communities for being “not quite human”, runs like a thread across identities, connecting (rather than uniting) many projects and trajectories in a global process of de-colonial cosmopolitanism; toward the horizon of pluri-versality as a uni-versal project.

3. Mehrzad Boroujerdi (Boroujerdi 1996) distinguished between “Orientalism in reverse” from “Nativism.” In the first case subjects that became oriental objects in Western knowledge, responded by making the West the other. By so doing, “Orientalism in reverse” accepts the rule of the game and attempts to change the content – not the terms – of the conversation. “Nativism” in Boroujerdi’s conceptualization is something different. The term “nativism” here may surprise members of the cosmopolitan club. Let’s first listen and then comment upon:

Nativism stands in the same relation to Orientalism in reverse as Eurocentrism does to Orientalism proper. Both Nativism and Eurocentrism provide an ontological and epistemological umbrella under which it becomes possible to develop a theory of history and a political platform. Whereas Eurocentrism does advocate such ideas as the uniqueness and superiority of the West and its unequivocal manifest destiny, Nativism champions the cause of abandoning, subverting, and reversing these same meta-narratives and master codes. Nativism was born of the lamentable circumstance of colonialism and the agonizing milieu of the post-World War II period of decolonization. It represents a cultural reflex on the part of many Third World intellectuals from Southeast Asia to the Caribbean eager to assert their newly found identities (1996, p. 14; italics mine).
The reader may suspect that we are here confronting another essentialist proposal. The interesting aspect of the proposal is that Frantz Fanon comes up, for an Iranian intellectual, as the paradigmatic example of “Nativism.” Boroujerdi doesn’t offer any specific reference or quotation as to why Fanon would be a paradigmatic example of “Nativism.” I suspect that he has in mind statements like this one:

I am ready to concede that on the plane of factual being the past existence of an Aztec civilization does not change anything very much in the diet of the Mexican peasant of today. But it has been remarked several times that this passionate search for a national culture which existed before the colonial era finds its legitimate reason in the anxiety shared by native intellectuals to shrink away from that Western culture in which they all risk being swamped. Because they realize they are in danger of losing their lives and thus becoming lost to their people, these men, hotheaded and with anger in their hearts, relentlessly determine to renew contact once more with the oldest and most pre-colonial springs of life of their people (Fanon (1963), pp. 209-210).

Let’s then translate “Nativism” into “Localism” and be clear that locals have been con-formed by the formation and transformation of the colonial matrix of power. The point is then that Localism emerges because the advent of a powerful intellectual and political elite some of then still linked to Europe through Marxism but in the colonies, and some plainly already decolonial. Localism, crossed and con-formed by historical forces (in this case, Persia, Islam, the Western creation of the Middle East as a region and the Middle Est becoming part of the Third World) then emerges as a pluri-versal response and confrontation with uni-versal Eurocentrism.

Eurocentrism, in the last analysis, is Western localism (or perhaps “nativism” is a good name for Eurocentrism) with a global design that became synonymous
with uni-versalism. Thus, Kant cosmopolitanism and its legacy propose the universalization of Western Nativism/Localism. And the Marxist left, for better or worst, belongs to that world. And this is a challenge for cosmopolitanism. On the contrary, non-Western localism is plural, since there are many multiple memories and colonial wounds infringed by racism, ways of life, languages, beliefs, experiences connected to the West but at the same time not subsumable to it. Localism (which shall not be confused with “national fundamentalisms” or “Nativism from the right”) should be pluri-versal and therefore decolonial. Since Localism originated “from the lamentable circumstance of colonialism”, or better yet, of the logic of coloniality common to different Western imperial/colonial expansion (Spain, France, England) and its surrogates after the sixteenth century (imperial Russia, Soviet Union, Japan), a trade mark of localism is the decolonial thread that connects and makes of pluri-versality a global project. De-colonial localism is global or if you wish cosmo-political. Thus we arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that if cosmopolitanism shall be preserved in the humanities goal toward the future it should be “cosmopolitan localism”, an oximoron no doubt, but the Kantian project of one localism being the uni-versal is untenable today. “Cosmopolitan localism” is another expression for pluri-versality as a global project. Kantian’s legacies shall be reduced to its proper localism and stripped off its imperial/global pretensions. Recognizing the “idea” doesn’t mean accepting its implementation. Cosmopolitanism can only work if there is no master-global design, but a global agreement in which no one will rule without being ruled. Tough call for those who believe that his/her party, religion or ideology is the best for every body and has to be imposed for the wellbeing of all and for universal peace. Tough but realistic call now that the global political society is growing and is on its feet; it is aware that the era of being ruled and obeying, or being repressed for disobeying, is reaching its limit.
Cosmopolitan localism means simply means that if cosmopolitan ideals are seriously considered, there is no need to take Kant as the blue print. Kant should be taken as a local ideal of a cosmopolitan world, the European idea. Since such imperial cosmopolitanism now is untenable, it is necessary to reduce Kantian legacies to size for there are many other local histories in which cosmopolitan projects emerge. It is already enough to have taken the idea of the cosmo-polis or orbis-terrarum as horizons of life. It is not necessary to carry with it the feelings, ideals, sentiments and desires of those who proposed the terms. Reducing Kantian legacies to size means that Euro-American concepts of cosmopolitanism have the right to exist but have no right to expect to be universal. Cosmopolitan localism means the multiplication of nodes, the active intervention of local cosmopolitan project from all over the world and the reduction of Western cosmopolitans to its own local history.

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