The Law of Command Responsibility

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International Committee of the Red Cross Unit for Relations with Armed and Security Forces 19 Avenue de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland T +41 22 734 60 01 F +41 22 733 20 57 E-mail: dc_com_fas.gva@icrc.org www.icrc.org. Original: English â€“ June 2002. COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY. AIM. [ Slide 2 ]. Command responsibility. 1. introduction. This lesson will focus on key issues of the law that directly affect you as commanders. This means command at any level. The commander-in-chief of an armed force obviously has overall responsibility, but the section commander and even individual soldiers also have responsibility in relation to the law of armed conflict.