A Case Study of Policy Innovation, International Institutions, and Cooperative Strategies: The Clinton Counterproliferation Policy Initiative, Russia’s “Loose Nukes,” and the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program

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Introduction and Background

One widely recognized counterproliferation success is from the Clinton era is the experience of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction programs with Russia and the former Soviet republics.¹ Reviews of Nunn-Lugar programs note that after a decade their projects have “gained the kind of political, bureaucratic, and budgetary support that has all but institutionalized them” (Sokolski and Riisager 2002, p. 2). In this view, the question is how to enhance these programs to gain additional benefits beyond the early projects for consolidating and controlling Soviet nuclear weapons in Russian territory. Graham Allison and other proliferation experts call for extending the Nunn-Lugar approach to eliminate nuclear weapons, control fissile materials and production facilities, deny terrorists access to nuclear weapons and technology, etc. (Allison 2004, p. 166).

This case study examines the policy development and implementation of the Clinton era Nunn-Lugar programs to provide insights into this positive example of success in counterproliferation policy.² Institutionalist theory provides scholarly insights for analyzing the Nunn-Lugar framework for further developing the potential for linking international relations theory with the practical lessons to be learned from a successful case of counterproliferation policy. Another insight to be gained is contrasting

¹ A 2004 Carnegie Endowment study reports: ‘The “Nunn-Lugar” or cooperative threat reduction programs to dismantle and secure WMD in Russia and the former Soviet Union have been remarkably cost-effective investments in U.S. security’ (Perkovich et al. 2004, p. 54).

² The institutionalist approach also provides a framework for thinking about a regional security regime that goes beyond the current six-party framework in Northeast Asia.
competitive strategies,\textsuperscript{3} such as addressed in coercive diplomacy theory in the previous case study on the Agreed Framework, versus a cooperative strategic approach, as suggested in institutionalist theory.

One option for counterproliferation policymaking is to leverage ongoing issues and concerns, the six-party talks, and the episodic crisis atmosphere, while building an institutional approach. Lepgold and Nincic (2002) address the theory and history of international institutionalism; the theoretical knowledge and practical experiences they recount suggest a roadmap for proceeding with institutional development. In brief, they propose a pattern of success based on international relations functionalist theories, as well as the recent history of the European Union and NATO.\textsuperscript{4} The option here is to nurture a small group of like-minded states and statesmen focused around one specific functional area (counterproliferation) and build effective rules, organizations and enforcement mechanisms.

**Institutionalism as a Cooperative Strategy for Change**

In the North Korean case, during the Agreed Framework negotiations, the Clinton Administration engaged in a traditional, diplomatic approach, stressing principles and techniques similar to those drawn from the scholarly international relations theories of coercive diplomacy. The North Korean Agreed Framework case is representative of top-down policy leadership. President Clinton, Secretary of Defense Perry, Secretary of State Christopher, and other high level executive branch stakeholders were engaged in

\textsuperscript{3} For details on a competitive strategies approach see David J. Andre, “Competitive Strategies: An Approach against Proliferation,” in Sokolski (2000).

\textsuperscript{4} Hemmer and Katzenstein (2001) also compare differences in U.S. Cold War approaches to successful regional arrangements in Europe and the lack of similar approaches in Asia. Their paper is significant for its emphasis on the impact of cultural and historical differences in contrasting favoring multilateral approaches for the U.S. in Europe, and bilateral approaches for the U.S. in Asia.
developing the Administration’s policy and overseeing the bilateral U.S. – North Korean negotiations. Other U.S. officials and allied governments were consulted, including the U.S. Congress and the governments of the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and Japan. The implementation of the Agreed Framework included the significant involvement of the United Nation’s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as well as active monitoring by the U.S. government, especially the intelligence agencies.

This case study of Nunn-Lugar programs to examine alternative approaches is significant for gaining insights into the conditions for developing effective national security counterproliferation policies. Given the history of the past decade, the Agreed Framework case suggests a failed counterproliferation effort. Given the lack of institutional and organizational roots, the Agreed Framework failed to achieve lasting effects in accordance with the U.S. objective of ending the North’s nuclear weapons program. In comparison then, why is the Nunn-Lugar policy outcome generally agreed to be more successful than the Agreed Framework experience? To gain these insights it is significant to study the leadership influence relationships from the middle as well as from the top-down – or by examining the Defense Department organizational processes at work in the Nunn-Lugar case.5

A more successful case—one led more directly by the Secretary of Defense, along with DOD staff and influenced by other organizational stakeholders, including an engaged Congress and regional players—suggests additional insights into the components of effective leadership in counterproliferation policymaking. What insights does the Nunn-Lugar case provide in terms of an instance where executive and organizational

5 For a comprehensive literature review of organizational processes, see Allison and Zelikow (1999), Chapter 3: Model II: Organizational Behavior.
leadership (leadership from the top and middle) contributed to successful and lasting policy innovation? What were the roles of the Defense Secretary and the DOD bureaucracy, as well as the roles of the key senators?

To gain theoretical insights to guide this case study, this case study introduces concepts drawn from the literature on international institutions. First, the American outlook on international security institutions in the past century will be described briefly. Next, the major ideas and views in institutional theory will be outlined. Then, the known conditions for success or failure in institution building will be discussed. Lastly, these ideas and conditions will guide an examination of U.S. policy as developed by the Secretary of Defense and other involved in the Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs to prevent WMD proliferation in the Former Soviet Republics.

The twentieth-century history of the U.S. posture toward international institutions includes three cycles of engagement followed by withdrawal (Schlesinger 2003, Ruggie 1993, Doyle 1997). In the early twentieth-century, the United States became heavily engaged with Europe through its participation in World War I. Following the Great War, President Wilson sought to construct a new world order sustained by an institutional regime of collective security through the formation of the League of Nations organization. To Wilson’s chagrin, the U.S. government later withdrew its support for this significant attempt at forming formal international institutions to maintain international security and peace. Thus began a period of withdrawal from such international organizations throughout of the interwar period between World Wars I and II.
The next cycle began abruptly as America entered World War II. Breaking a traditional of no entangling alliances dating from George Washington’s presidency, the United States became directly involved in a military alliance with Great Britain, and then other nations, including the Soviet Union. At the end of this war, guided first by President Franklin Roosevelt and then Harry Truman, the U.S. used its superpower status and international diplomacy to create the conditions for establishing the United Nations (Schlesinger 2003). During most of the Cold War period, U.S. involvement with other Western European nations in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was also a profound push toward multilateral institution and organization building.

There was a conservative backlash against international institutions that came about with the election of President Ronald Reagan in 1980 (Kirkpatrick 1997). This conservative bias against international organizations, and especially the United Nations was echoed in the United Kingdom with the election of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union during the George H.W. Bush (hereafter, George Bush) presidency, international institutions came to be viewed more favorably once again. In 1991, George Bush called for a renewed international order under U.N. guidance after a successful international coalition contributed to the defeat of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi forces in the Gulf War (Bush and Scowcroft 1998). President Clinton continued this wave of engagement, promoting a policy of assertive multilateralism, especially pronounced in the coalition diplomacy and difficulties with U.N. and NATO policymakers regarding the employment of peacekeeping armed forces in the Balkans (Albright 2003, Holbrooke 1999, Clark 2001).
The cycle again showed signs of again reversing away from international institutions as the second-term Clinton Administration concerns grew regarding U.S. strength being overextended, especially after experiencing difficulties in international peacekeeping efforts in Haiti, Somalia and the Balkans. During the 2000 presidential election, American engagement and intervention abroad through international institutions came under intense criticism in George W. Bush’s campaign. With the second Bush’s election, there was evidence of a neoconservative backlash against international institutions (Frum and Perle 2003). Soon after the election, the United States pulled out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty with the Russians. Antipathy toward international institutions could be observed even more clearly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. For instance, in a 2002 U.N. speech, George W. Bush clearly signaled his intention for the U.S. to go it alone if the U.N. did not act against Saddam Hussein. He said: “We will work with the U.N. Security Council … But the purposes of the United States should not be doubted. The Security Council resolutions will be enforced – the just demands of peace and security will be met – or action will be unavoidable” (George W. Bush 2002).

The watershed moment for the new posture was highlighted in America’s war in Iraq starting in 2002, which the U.N. Secretary General, Kofi Annan, viewed as illegal in terms of international law. In response to a BBC journalist’s pointed questions about the U.S. war in Iraq, Annan replied: “Yes, I have indicated it is not in conformity with the U.N. Charter, from our point of view and from the Charter point of view it was illegal” (Annan 2004). The second Bush Administration had certainly not reduced involvement abroad as promised in the 2000 presidential campaign, and its apparent lack of patience
for the diplomacy necessary for gaining U.N. approval for war (as authorized by the U.N. Charter’s Chapter VII) is cited as a cause for the rush to war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

Given the prominence of the U.N. and NATO since World War II as well as the differing views of various U.S. Administration’s views on the efficacy of international institutions and multilateral organizations, insights on international institutions are important to guide an understanding of the conditions for promoting effective policymakers. For instance, the literature on international institutions addresses the notion of these shifting world views in U.S. foreign and national security policies. Legro explores “why states fundamentally change their long-held ideas toward international affairs” and identifies two stages in such an ideational shift (Legro 2000, p. 254). The “reigning consensus” must collapse, and then follows the consolidation of a new dominant and viable idea (Legro 2000, pp. 263, 265-266). If there is a new shift toward reengagement on the horizon, it remains to be learned what conditions tend to precipitate the collapse of one Administration’s views and on the other hand what conditions lead to the emergence of a new strategic approach. Despite periodic American anxiety over institutional attachments, the threats of nuclear weapons and technology proliferation and terrorism require policymakers address these issues. The recent history of U.S.-North Korean relations suggests that the lack of supporting institutional structures account in part for the breakdown in the Agreed Framework. Were there supporting institutional structures that account for the relative success of Nunn-Lugar programs?

**International Institutions Theory: Incremental or Transformational Change?**
This case study next reviews the major contending scholars’ ideas regarding international institutions in order to inform an understanding of U.S. policy regarding existing and emerging international institutions. The literature on international institutions frames an examination of the origins and purposes of institutions in several ways. In the realist world view, the pursuit of power forms the basis of any institutions that may arise (Mearsheimer 2001). Institutions are, in essence, a formalization of the distribution of power in the international system (Ikenberry 2001, p. 11). In the realist or power politics framework, states define their interests competitively and institutions are weak in comparison with states (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, pp. 148-149). Neorealism, as formulated by Waltz, emphasizes the importance of the balance of power among an anarchical world of states (Waltz 1959, Art and Waltz 1999). Neorealism regards institutions as part of an international order, that is, the “unintended outcome of balancing pressures or a reflection of learned and formalized rules of equilibrium and balance” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 11). One strain of neorealism stresses the important role that a hegemonic power plays in institution formation: preponderant power may allow the hegemon to offer incentives to weaker states that cooperate in the building of a particular order.

In contrast to realism, a liberal-internationalist approach proposes that a natural harmony of interests facilitates institution building (Doyle 1997). According to the liberal worldview, overlapping values and goals are the originators of international norms, regimes, and organizations. Neoliberalism argues that institutions act “as agreements or contracts between actors that function to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and solve collective action problems” (Keohane 2002; Ikenberry 2001, p. 15). Increased
efficiency is at the core of neoliberalism: by eliminating the need to attend multiple bilateral forums for every single issue, the transaction costs of doing international political business are lowered. Keohane first formulated this view, which stresses the importance of information flows, enforcement, and monitoring. A key concern of neoliberalism is that “institutions provide information to states and reduce the incentives for cheating” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 16).

Following the liberal traditions is a concept known as functionalism, which elevates individual issues as the primary source of institutions. A functionalist argues that the most effective institutions are those that serve practical functions as opposed to “grand political objectives” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 144). According to functionalist international relations scholars, an institution arises to address a specific concern through a “spontaneous, bottom-up process” (p. 144).  

Apart from both the realist and liberal traditions stands the more sociologically-based concept called constructivism. According to Ikenberry, institutions are “diffuse and socially constructed worldviews that bound and shape the strategic behavior of individuals and states,” which serve as “cognitive maps” for state actors (Ikenberry 2001, p. 15). Constructivism does not assume that the interests of actors are fixed, but asserts that social structures shape preferences (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 150). Institutions

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6 Lepgold and Nincic are bullish on the utility of international institutions, writing: “In principle, well-designed international institutions provide a way to develop and implement common policies to deal with collective problems, and it is hard to find an international issue that has not become increasingly institutionalized in recent decades.” Furthermore, for breaching the international relations theory-practice gap, they emphasize that “the theoretical and empirical literature on international institutions should carry important practical implications” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001, p. 139). They go on to urge continued scholarship: “If scholarly work on international institutions can shed light on these issues [globalization and the backlash] by illuminating the opportunities, constraints, and consequences of multilateral actions, it should help officials shape external pursuits though multilateral means” (p. 139).
define the group identity of a set of states by embodying and propagating shared norms (p. 151).

Given these major approaches to institutional theory, what do we know about what makes a successful institution? What factors should be taken into account? Ikenberry addresses the initial context for institutions in writing that “Stable political orders tend to be those that have low returns to power and high returns to institutions” (Ikenberry 2001, p. 266). Orders that have low returns to power feature “systematic institutional limits” on what participants can do with their individual power (p. 266). High returns to institutions result in working organizations, which become hard to replace (p. 268). According to Ikenberry then, “The more complex, adaptable, and autonomous” an institution is, the more it can lower the returns to power (p. 269).

Ruggie also addresses the initial conditions for institutional formation and survival, writing that “A permissive domestic environment” in the leading world state or states is very important for setting the scene for a successful institution (Ruggie 1993, p. 8). For example, Ruggie claims that American hegemony was more important than the mere existence of an international hegemon to the flourishing of recent multilateral institutions (p. 8). Thus, a leading state that looks on multilateral institutions in a very unfavorable manner may sow the seeds of destruction, or at least of weakening, for certain institutions that for whatever reasons are perceived as not serving the hegemon’s state interests. In her institutional analysis on the overriding importance of initial

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7 Ikenberry refers to institutions “stickiness,” a term which he does not define. The wording implies those institutions that last, such as the United Nations, NATO, the WTO, etc. as opposed to those develop in concept, but do not survive the initial founding conditions, such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), which ceased to function during the U.S. disengagement from the War in Vietnam.
conditions for institution building, Zegart strongly emphasizes stressing the critical influence of founding moments in the creation of both successful and unsuccessful security agencies (Zegart 1999).

Related to neoliberalism’s emphasis on effective enforcement and monitoring, Lepgold and Nincic emphasize four key dimensions to take into account when crafting an institution. First, the manner in which information is pooled inside the institution is important. Good pooling of information can mitigate cooperation problems. Second, to what extent are rules crafted so as to be easily enforced? Regulations that come with incentives to comply are easier to enforce. Third, the number of members in an institution is important. The smaller the group’s membership, the easier it is to resolve difficulties. Fourth, the precision of rules and monitoring procedures are significant. Are rules mildly, modestly, or heavily elaborate or detailed? In general of course, more elaborate rules are more difficult to enforce.

In addition to these dimensions, several other issues raised by neoliberal thought may affect the success of institutions, according to Lepgold and Nincic. How many issues does the institution intend to address? The degree of bundling together of different issues is important. This question is highly relevant to the functionalist approach, which view institutions as essentially issue-based forums. Additionally, the way that issues are organized internationally figures into the calculus. How an issue is treated, and by whom, is important to how other actors will respond. Lastly, the choice of partners figures prominently. How like-minded is the membership of an institution? Is it generally true

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8 Ideas in this paragraph on these four key dimensions are summarized from Lepgold and Nincic (2001, pp. 154-159).
that members must share the necessary values to accomplish a particular end with
efficiency?

A summary of several key points will serve to guide the remainder of this case
study. Observations include both macro and micro perspectives on the areas guiding an
analysis of the Nunn-Lugar case. From the macro-political level the notion of a world
view, and especially a hegemon’s world view, is significant. This builds on Legro’s idea
regarding changes resulting from the collapse of a reigning consensus and the emergence
of a new dominant and viable idea in world politics.

Scholars’ interpretations of worldviews revolve around the four dominant
perspectives discussed above: realism, liberalism, functionalism, and constructivism.
Each proposes alternatives for policymaking as well as assumptions regarding the
relevance of institutions as instruments of statecraft. The state leaders’ worldviews,
especially for presidents and secretaries of defense, will have important policy
implications. For realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer, the state is the focus of attention
and its pursuit of self-interest in an anarchic world is of supreme important. In
Ikenberry’s characterization of neo-realism, however, balance of power matters as much
as self-interest as a moderator of state power. In a neo-realist administration for instance,
institutions may serve the states interests to the extent that the arrangements reflect
learned and formal rules of equilibrium and balance – that reinforce stability and order,
and, therefore, the position of dominant nation-states, or great powers.

Liberalism stresses a harmony of interests among nations in an international
community. For liberals, institution building is a natural sign of progress. For
neoliberals there are more specific considerations than notions of community for its own
sake. The neoliberals look for agreements and contracts to underpin international relations. Agreements include formal ways to reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs, and serve to solve problems of collective actions. In this regard the neoliberal, the functionalist, as well as the realist approaches align in terms of a harmony of interests in solving problems through collective action that ultimately serves state’s purposes or self interests. Thus, Keohane (2002, p. 3) argues forcefully that international institutions perform state tasks vital for enabling cooperation. In fact, Keohane disdains liberal or neoliberal labels for his theorizing and instead considers himself a staunch institutionalist.

Constructivism is another approach with more emphasis on creating and developing shared values in world politics. Katzenstein and Ikenberry characterize institutions as a product of diffuse and socially constructed world views. Again there is some overlap with realists in the sense of effective institutions providing high returns to power, or as Katzenstein characterizes it, containing a lasting quality that makes them hard to replace because they further both state values and interests.

Multilateralist Ruggie and neoinstitutionalist Zegart provide further insights regarding the importance of initial or founding conditions as most significant for determining institutional effectiveness. These initial conditions normally reflect the domestic environment of the leading state, or hegemon. Examples would include the importance of the U.S. in the founding of the United Nations post World War II (Schlesinger 2003). Other neoliberal thoughts linked to functional approaches include the idea of bundling together issues and the number of partners involved. Ruggie and other authors, especially in the functionalist school, argue that fewer partners, chosen
because they share values (as in the European Union) and focused issues that serve common interests (as in halting the spread of nuclear weapons), is more likely to succeed.

In terms relative to the international security studies literature discussed above and the Agreed Framework experience, Nunn-Lugar represents a narrative of leadership, primarily as leadership from the top and middle. It includes a varied group of players involved in the program’s founding and evolution throughout the 1990s. The process of tracing Nunn-Lugar’s development will provide insights into Gottemoeller’s observation that: “Stable cooperation, therefore, is likely to require both attention from on high and bureaucratic commitment at a lower level” (Gottemoeller in Nolan, Finel and Finlay 2003, p. 145). One key concept for examining the conditions for achieving stable cooperation includes the notion of policy relevance.

The literature on international institutions offers two aspects of policymaking “relevance” (Lepgold and Nincic 2001). These include policy and instrumental relevance. Policy relevance refers to the macro or strategic aspects of policy design in international relations. Instrumental relevance refers to micro or tactical perspectives. The neoliberalist and constructivist theorists summarized above note the significance of actors’ preferences to shape policy choices. The literature highlights five areas that suggest the necessary and sufficient conditions for policy relevance including first and foremost, complementary national interests. That is, the institution includes accepted values, the goals are compatible for the long term, and there is an investment in any changes in preferences. International institutions can change relations though regimes, defined as “norms and rules that regulate behavior in specific issue areas involving international activities” (Lepgold and Nincic, p. 139). As Ruggie suggests, the institution
will also be more successful if it assures the hegemon’s support. Hegemon in this context and in this case refers to the United States as the most powerful nation-state in the post Cold War period, as defined in realist terms regarding national power (Morgenthau 1968, Mearsheimer 2001, Nuechterlein 1985).

The second aspect of policy relevance addresses the hegemon’s committing resources and supporting rules. These rules include a commitment to essential principles and rules of order, along with partners to share burdens and coordinate policy. Third is the perception of the institution as a carrier of norms, identity and knowledge. This includes codifying and augmenting legal norms, and especially norms that empower what are perceived as legitimate claims. One additional condition is that preferences regarding norms, identity and knowledge evolve through interaction and presumably not through domination or forcing. Fourth are the expectations regarding the costs and consequences of activities conducted through international institutions. In brief, are there stable expectations for joint coordination that serve agreed upon state purposes? The fifth variable involves the role of the institution within the policymaking community. The literature suggests that the domain is limited to situations where the states already agree on the policy objectives or ends. Again, the functionalist school suggests the important influence of special, expert agencies.

Instrumental relevance refers to the micro dimensions of policy formation, including incentive structures, monitoring and enforcement, calculations of future benefits and costs, and tools for facilitating effective, productive bargains. Incentive structures include positive factors to make cooperation more likely, as well as negative

9 Ideas in this paragraph are drawn from Lepgold and Nincic (2001).
factors to prevent defectors. Calculations of future benefits and costs serve to lengthen
the “shadow of the future” to increase participants’ rational choices supporting institution
building for the long term (Fearon 1998). Scholars point to eight factors for
strengthening effective and productive agreements. In brief, these include:

1. Rules that stabilize expectations;
2. Information to send and receive signals;
3. Clear standards;
4. Information about compliance;
5. Credible penalties;
6. Enforcement mechanisms;
7. Cooperation through information sharing; and
8. Regulating the number of participants.

Policy and instrumental relevance provide a lengthy list of variables for
examining the conditions for successful leadership from the top and middle for effective
policy and institution building.

*Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case: Visionary-
Rhetorical Leadership and Forging Complementary National Interests*

This case study proceeds by examining the Nunn-Lugar, Cooperative Threat
Reduction case, as a key program in the Clinton Counterproliferation Policy Initiative.
Government policymakers and national security scholars engaged in proliferation
policymaking were among the first to seize the opportunity for forming new relationships
among the U.S., Russia, and the former Soviet republics (FSR) following the fall of the
Berlin Wall. George Bush’s notion of a new world order was significant for the
executive branch and especially the state and defense departments’ promotion of new
initiatives (Bush & Scowcroft 1998). In the following Clinton Administration, in
reflecting on his experiences as Secretary of Defense, Perry notes the significance of the post Cold War period for establishing an “effective U.S. partnership with Russia in the security sphere” (Carter & Perry 1999, p. 51). Carter and Perry point to the early post Cold War discussions urging Russia’s policy elite to become “integrationists” to achieve a new, “self-respecting place in the world order” (p. 51).

The early, fluid nature of international environment during the first Clinton Administration required adjustments to identify the complementarities of U.S. and Russian national interests. The Defense Department engaged in repeated redesigns of Nunn-Lugar programs in the initial stages to “adapt its existing patterns of cooperation to the realities of Russia at this stage of its continuous revolution” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 79). The pattern includes the Administration’s interest in shaping the new Russian government’s preferences. Perry writes that the Nunn-Lugar programs were launched when the new Russia was in its early state and needed immediate assistance: the “political backdrop and economic motivation of Russian’s leaders” in the early post Cold War period was, as we now know, “totally different” from the values and preferences of the Soviet regime (p. 79).

In the early Nunn-Lugar period the nation’s involved also introduced unique, new situations. The Defense Department efforts had to proceed in accordance with a three party foreign policy approach involving the U.S., Russia, and the Ukraine (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 83). The U.S. approach evolved quickly into from bilateral to trilateral diplomacy, extending the Nunn-Lugar approach to denuclearize the Ukraine, and engage

10 In several articles prominent international relations scholars argued for the increased stability and security of post Cold War Europe, with the Ukraine as a nuclear weapons state (see in particular writings by international relations theorists Mearsheimer and Waltz).
the Ukrainians in extensive military-to-military contacts. Working along constructivist lines, Administration diplomacy and policymaking attempted to reform Russian and Ukrainian values and preferences regarding traditional and long-standing security threats, as well as offer opportunities for a more cooperative future for all participants in the new world, or at least new regional order.

**Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case: Transactional Leadership as Rulemaking, Resourcing, and Supporting Innovation**

The idea of specific, cooperative foreign policies and defense programs continued to expand the complexity of shaping complementary national interests. For instance, in negotiating the START II Cold War arms control regime, the U.S. had to engage the still forming Russian democracy with its new, active, and fragmented Duma -- a markedly different environment than the iron rule of the Soviet Communist Party leadership in Cold War era. The parliamentarians concerns about the status of the continuity of the Nixon era Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty were further complicated by historical Russian security concerns reawakened by the initiatives for NATO’s eastward expansion. Administration counterproliferation policy efforts with the Russians continued along the path started by Nunn-Lugar to include programs of greater complexity and depth over time.\(^{11}\)

In their book, *Preventive Defense*, Ashton Carter and William Perry discuss early administration approaches and their experiences as defense department officials in the

\(^{11}\) For example, in the second Clinton Administration, Defense Secretary Cohen points to the continuation of arms control programs, such as the 1998 Clinton-Yeltsin Moscow Summit, and the development of a joint U.S.-Russian Moscow center for information sharing on ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles. The center included the announcement of early launch detection, early warning systems, and technical programs on observation satellites (Cohen 2000, p. 8-76). These extensive program developments reflect the increasing benefits of cooperative and complementary security preferences.
first Clinton Administration. As discussed above, the George Bush and then Clinton Administrations, in supporting Senators Nunn and Lugar’s initiative, responded quickly to the new threat of nuclear armed former Soviet republics. Under the authorizing Nunn-Lugar legislation, DOD policymakers addressed “loose nukes” issues with programs to eliminate nuclear weapons and fissile material in the Ukraine, and then in Kazakhstan, and Belarus (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 69). Special projects, such as Project Sapphire removed weapons grade plutonium and enriched uranium from Kazakhstan and included internal U.S. collaboration among the Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and the CIA (p. 67). A pattern of similar efforts were taken to incorporate new members to the U.S.’s preferred world order are also evident in the second Clinton Administration, for instance with respect to China.12

During the second Clinton Administration, Defense Secretary Cohen continued the trend toward international institution building or multilateralism (Ruggie 1993). From the defense policy documents, such as the Annual Reports to the President and Congress, there was a drumbeat for the U.S.’s leading role in supporting international institutions.13 The 2000 document highlights the significance of the U.S. role in “shaping”14 the international environment through multilateral alliances, transparency,

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12 Secretary Cohen noted similar intentions for bringing China into the international community by: seeking Chinese adherence to international standards on weapons proliferation; international trade and human rights initiatives; and increasing China’s transparency as well as confidence building measures such as military-to-military exchanges (Cohen 2000, p. 11).

13 Examples below from the 2000 Report are illustrative of the Administration’s consistently stated policies in Annual DOD Reports from 1996 though 2000.

14 The idea of “Shaping of the International Environment” was introduced a an element of Defense Strategy (alongside “responding” and “preparing”) in the 1997 “Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review” (p. 9). This idea was controversial at the time, especially among NATO allies who perceived this as an expression of overt U.S. dominance and hegemonic intent and who objected in particular to being thought of as being the object of U.S. directed change (or of being “shaped” or changed by an external state).
trust, and confidence building, as well as through limiting dangerous military technologies (Cohen 2000, pp. 4-5). The dangers or threats section focus on reducing or eliminating nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. The Report supports existing arms control agreements including the U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework; Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs with Russia, the Ukraine and Kazakhstan; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Nonproliferation Treaty; and the Missile Technology Control Regime. The Report also highlights the significance of identifying and controlling nuclear fissile materials that can be used for nuclear biological and chemical (NBC) weapons and delivery systems.

The Defense Department also refers to the Administration’s nuclear posture statements and reports. The 2000 Report emphasizes the importance of U.S. nuclear weapons to deter aggression through a wide range of responses along with the ability to hedge against future threats (Cohen 2000, pp. 5-6). Secretary Cohen also reinforces the U.S. commitment to the strategic arms control regime and the Administration’s intent to conduct further arms control talks with Russia by beginning a round of START III negotiations. For instance, the START III initiative was announced after a Clinton-Yeltsin summit in 1997 in Helsinki (Cohen 2000, p. 6).

Secretary Cohen continues to address U.S. support for a multilateral, regional order in Europe (Cohen 2000, p. 9). He highlights U.S. defense objectives in Europe and the significance of cooperative relations with Russia, Ukraine, Central and Eastern Europe, and NATO. The 2000 Report points out that the U.S., Russia, and Europe
“should also work together” with all the “new independent states” to counter the proliferation of WMD and missile delivery systems (Cohen 2000, p. 9-10).

Cohen singles out Asian regional relations as well. He cites the importance of traditional defense relationships with Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea as well as engaging China (Cohen 2000, p. 10-11). Again the significance of the Agreed Framework is trumpeted. The Secretary places special emphasis on the U.S. – Japanese security relationship, which he refers to as the “linchpin” of U.S. security in Asia (Cohen 2000, p. 11). Cohen’s final DOD Annual Report focuses on maintaining “traditional” relationships, but does not emphasize plans or programs for reforming or transforming European and Asian security alliances.15

Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case: Participatory Leadership and Constructing Shared Norms, Identity, and Knowledge

The importance of the need for building the norms, identities, and knowledge for developing institutionally relevant policy are not highlighted in DOD documents. There are no references in the 2000 Report to the defense department or U.S.’s broader role in institution building for promoting legal norms, legitimate claims, and preferences for positive interactions and change. The Report does mention early Nunn-Lugar barriers in overcoming fifty years of Cold War mistrust with the Russians (Cohen 2000, p. 76). In Carter and Perry’s account some mention is also made of Clinton and Gore interventions to develop trust with the new governments of Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus.

15 Note: This is a curious omission given the drumbeat within the Defense Department to transform the American armed forces throughout the post-Cold War era, from Clinton to the present George W. Bush Administrations.
But the official DOD documents are largely silent on building institutional norms, identity and knowledge. Nevertheless the Nunn-Lugar programmatic successes are not tied to the larger issues regarding building a community of shared norms, values and identities in terms of international institutions, arms control and security regimes, or multilateral organizations.\textsuperscript{16}

**Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case:**  
**Change and Performance Management as Measuring Costs and Consequences**

The key costs and consequences of international institutions are also not mentioned in detail in DOD Annual Reports. Carter and Perry (1999, p. 76) do note some of the consequences of Nunn-Lugar in terms of budgetary and performance results. For instance, they highlight $2.4 billion in funding as of mid-1998. They go on to point to the success of 40 engineering projects in Russia to build safeguards for existing stockpiles, dismantle weapons and missiles and convert defense industry to civilian purposes. Carter and Perry also write of the success of destroying 4800 nuclear weapons, removing nuclear weapons from all non-Russian former Soviet republics and eliminating proliferation threats in Belarus, Kazakhstan and the Ukraine. Perry and Carter stress that they “never expected this astounding degree of success” and credit Nunn-Lugar initiatives for no early post-Cold War loose nukes problems (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 77). In addition, Carter and Perry attribute part of these great successes to the extraordinary cooperation inside the Washington policy making community.

\textsuperscript{16} In a similar manner, a 2004 Carnegie Report also highlights the hard statistics of Nunn-Lugar’s success without paying similar attention to the institution building aspects. The Report notes that: “As of December 31, 2003, the Nunn-Lugar program had deactivated 6,252 nuclear warheads and destroyed 527 ballistic missiles, 455 ballistic missile silos” … etc. (Perkovich et al. 2004, fn 58, p. 90).
Relating Institutionalist Theory and Practice in the Nunn-Lugar Case:  
Public Leadership, Policy Innovation, and Networks for Change

The fifth dimension of policy relevance relates international institutions and the role of the policymaking community. The national security “policymaking community” can be an open ended network. The community in this case includes specific U.S. government legislators, departments and agencies as well as universities and research institutes as players or stakeholders in counterproliferation policymaking. The phrase “policymaking community” here is not limited to only the U.S. defense department and special agencies involved in Nunn-Lugar implementation. As discussed next, one example of effective policy implementation within the wider policymaking community is the DOD’s top-secret Operation Sapphire, conducted in 1994.

Sapphire was the first special operation implemented as part of Nunn-Lugar. Carter and Perry strongly emphasize the success of Operation Sapphire in the first Clinton term (Carter and Perry 1999, pp. 65-68). The operation resulted in the removal from Kazakhstan of 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, or the equivalent of enough fissile material for 60 Hiroshima-Nagasaki nuclear bombs. The U.S. government policy community, or Washington interagency players, included the departments of defense, energy, and state, along with the CIA and U.S. Air Force. Carter and Perry report the successfully internal and external coordination with the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan -- all made possible due to the 1992 Nunn-Lugar legislation and implementing programs.

Carter and Perry trace the genesis of the Nunn-Lugar approach to the senators 1980s, Cold War concerns about nuclear accidents (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 70). The
senators were at the forefront of U.S. congressional activities regarding establishing nuclear risk reduction centers. Their early efforts involved agencies and organizations outside of government. Early efforts, by Senators Nunn and Lugar and their staffs, included work with think tanks and universities. Ashton Carter’s late 1980s Harvard proliferation studies on the Soviet nuclear arsenal led to a series of meetings hosted by Harvard’s Belfer Center along with Perry’s affiliation with Stanford University (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 77). Workshops included experts from the Carnegie Corporation of New York and the Brookings Institution. This loosely coupled nonproliferation community set the stage for concerns about nuclear and fissile material safeguards following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The astonishingly rapid progress of Nunn-Lugar legislation, passed within nine days of its first draft, included Senate passage on November 28, 1991 on an 86-6 vote. The House version of the bill, supported by House Armed Services Committee Chairman, and later Clinton’s first Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, passed in the House of Representative through a voice vote.

These preliminary efforts, in building proliferation knowledge and legislation, were extended though the 1993 shift of Carter and Perry from academia to government service. Carter notes that to spearhead Nunn-Lugar implementation, to assist Russia in safeguarding nuclear stockpiles, required “a whole new organization” (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 73). He points also to starting by “crafting a set of objectives” and identify officials in partner countries to coordinate efforts.

Initiating a new national security program required forming a coordinating interagency group as well as overcoming barriers to implementation. Carter and Perry go on to emphasize the significant barriers that challenged Nunn-Lugar implementation.
The notoriously cumbersome Pentagon acquisition system had to extend to spending dollars in overseas engineering project, which in turn according to Carter and Perry required something “history had never before permitted,” that is, running U.S. programs with and within the Soviet Union (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 74).

The early Nunn-Lugar period also meet some resistance in the U.S. Congress. The congressional barrier involved reversing a mindset from defense versus the Soviet threat to spending for Russian military housing and defense industry conversion to civilian, commercial pursuits. Given the rapid pace of Nunn-Lugar legislation, implementation money had to be reprogrammed from the 1993 defense budget, which requires much bureaucratic work in adjusting appropriations (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 74). In addition, the old arms control bureaucracy, centered in the defense and state departments had to shift from Cold War arms control perspectives and patterns to new approaches.

There were also of course barriers within the new and relatively unstable Russia. For instance, Carter and Perry note the problems of coordination with MINATOM the former Soviet nuclear research and development agency, especially in regard to new tasks of dismantling nuclear weapons and the long term safeguards and storage of fissile materials (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80).

The writing in later Defense Department documents reveals a moderation, or decline, in the Secretary of Defense’s initiatives for extending the DOD role and building on the early Nunn-Lugar successes. For instance, by the time of the 2000 Annual Report, Cohen focuses on a narrower range of issues with respect to counterproliferation policy. He cites the importance of the armed forces capacity to respond to “asymmetric threats”
and is mainly concerned with fighting on a NBC battlefield, with a vague sentence on increasing unspecified dollar amounts for “institutions of counterproliferation” (Cohen 2000, p. 19).

Counterproliferation as counter-NBC operations for battlefield forces is a significant operational capability, but at the strategic level falls short of the Nunn-Lugar objectives of eliminating and safeguarding nuclear weapons and stockpiles. The focus of the 2000 document and defense policy is mainly directed towards continuing the modernization of existing Cold War “legacy” weapons systems, or platforms, such as tanks, helicopters, aircraft carriers and submarines and jet aircraft, while conducting research and development for cutting edge technologies (Cohen 2000, p. 8). The Report proposes the need for weapons system development using Persian Gulf War scenarios. The Report also presents information regarding on-going modernizations, such as updating internal management, and research and development programs as revolutionary, citing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) as the driving force for acquiring new technologies, and the Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) for adopting the presumed better business practices of the 1990s corporate sector. Critics charge that these are actually minor and insignificant changes and a normal part of the Pentagon’s internal “fight for defense dollars” (Wilson 2000). The evidence from official documents reveals a downward trend, or at least a leveling off, in DOD’s emphasis on counterproliferation policy and programs.

Case study Finding and Conclusions:
Public Leadership and Transformational Change
The documentary evidence suggests an early peak in Clinton era counterproliferation policymaking. The essential role of key department leaders, such as Defense Secretary Perry and Assistant Secretary Carter in influencing the Washington policymaking process is most significant. Adding weight in terms of political initiative and legislation, as well as budgetary support, was provided by experienced, senior legislators. In terms of policy relevance several points stand out in addition to the overall assessment of effective leadership from several levels, including the defense secretary, Congress, think tanks, and implementing bureaucracies -- along with similar leadership levels within the other foreign governments involved.

National interests in the Nunn-Lugar case were complimentary and expressed clearly by the governmental leaders involved in policymaking. The values of controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons were seen as compatible with long term goals that in the Russian case included radically transforming its defense posture and international diplomacy. There were significant investments in terms of time and money to change preferences for an institutional approach to change relations through a regime change in arms control and fundamental roles of nuclear weapons in a new, post-Cold War order. The remaining superpower, or in institutional terms, the U.S. as hegemon, assured its support of this new order. Additional resources were committed to reinforce the essential principles of the new order to eliminate nuclear weapons from non-Russian, former Soviet Republics. Importantly, the former republics were engaged in the process to share the burdens of coordinating the policy and its implementation.

The largely bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the newly emerging Russia solidified the norms, identity, and knowledge for institutionalizing the Nunn-Lugar
counterproliferation policies. Ironically, the long Cold War history of nuclear mirror-imaging and arms control contributed to common frames of references regarding the process and substance for conducting interstate negotiations on nuclear weapons issues. Common preferences were revealed through interactions that included the former Soviet Republics. The evolving norms regarding the elimination of nuclear weapons, and some fissile materials empowered the diplomats and defense officials to complete counterproliferation policymaking in accordance with shared and legitimate claims of policy relevance. In the Nunn-Lugar case, the emergence of shared norms, identity, and knowledge in the window of opportunity following the end of the Cold War empowered U.S., Russian and FSR policymakers to conduct revolutionary counterproliferation policies.

The costs and consequences of action through the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs also stabilized expectations for joint coordination. Funding through the congressional budget process, reinforced through the defense department’s highly regulated planning, programming and budgeting system, provided a degree of stability and transparency for implementing programs, as well as established mechanisms for engaged congressional oversight. In essence, the programmatic processes of the U.S. Congress and bureaucracy for implementing Nunn-Lugar programs served the agreed upon Administration’s counterproliferation objectives in visible ways.

The Nunn-Lugar case also provides evidence of the significance of the network aspects of the counterproliferation policymaking community. The functional role of a wide variety of specialized agencies in the early Nunn-Lugar period, all influenced policymaking in a common direction towards clarifying goals and programs, and guiding
the policymaking community. The overarching and clear program goals regarding eliminating nuclear weapons in former Soviet Republics at a unique time in history served as a strong foundation for counterproliferation policy efforts.

One area where Nunn-Lugar reveals a shortcoming in institution building is as an early successful innovation, or pilot test, to build on in terms of expanding geographically beyond Russia and the former Soviet Republics to other areas of proliferation concern, such as South (India and Pakistan) and Northeast (North Korea) Asia and the Middle East (Iraq and Iran). In other words, the early Nunn-Lugar successes were not replicated in other areas of proliferation concern. Additional insights into the difficulties of institution building are revealed in examining the nature and scope of what theorists call the instrumental relevance of institutions. The high costs of developing effective and efficient institutions to serve as an instrument of state policy can be seen in the complexities in the four dimensions for assessing instrumental relevance including: incentive structures; monitoring and enforcement processes; calculations of future benefits; and facilitating bargaining.

Case study Finding and Conclusions:
Transactional Change and Incentive Structures

U.S. incentives for Cooperative Threat Reduction programs were fairly obvious. The timing of the Nunn-Lugar initiatives was of course related directly to a unique opportunity at the end of the Cold War to eliminate dangerous proliferation threats. The weakness of Soviet safeguards and stockpile security were already known in the defense

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17 In a similar manner Graham Allison 2004 book, *Nuclear Terrorism* follows a similar leadership pattern, as an expert’s “outside-in” efforts to influence Bush Administration counterproliferation and terrorism policy.
expert community as a result of the 1980s Harvard Belfer Center studies. While there were a number of international relations scholars debating the increased stability of multiple nuclear powers, including the Ukraine and others as a hedge against future Russian aggression\(^\text{18}\) the conventional wisdom in the policy community coalesced around the idea of providing incentives to eliminate nuclear weapons threats in an uncertain post Cold War environment. The U.S. and Russian debates over Nunn-Lugar included calculations of the benefits and costs of a new, innovative approach.

Carter and Perry write of the high transaction costs of early Nunn-Lugar negotiations (1999, p. 73). The U.S. was mainly interested in dismantling Soviet missiles as a way to serve U.S. national security interests. The Russian and former Soviet republics were interested in social assistance to convert military forces, scientists, and its vast military-industrial complex to civilian, commercial uses. Incentives were also important to chart a future direction for Nunn-Lugar to include fissile materials as well as existing missiles and bombs. In this sense, institution building includes improving the incentives for likely cooperation as well as for preventing later defectors who would still possess materials useful for so-called dirty bombs as well as nuclear merchandise for the terrorist black market. Thus, institution building initiated through Nunn-Lugar provides incentives for continuing to engage Russia and the former Soviet republics in an ongoing process for ideas such as forming international fissile material repositories with funds from an international consortium to manage the global stockpile for peaceful purposes, such as producing non-weapons-grade nuclear reactor fuel (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80).

Incentive structures in the Nunn-Lugar case actually involved a wider range of options than were visible through the lens of traditional arms control negotiations. In the case of the Ukraine, a wide angle perspective reveals three separate sets of incentives Carter and Perry 1999, p. 83). The first level included trilateral diplomacy conducted by the United States, Russia and the Ukraine. These negotiations focused on economic incentives for defense conversions, market reforms, and economic development. At a second level, incentives were necessary to meet the Ukraine’s security concerns. U.S., European and Russian relations were all involved in the resulting defense programs for military-to-military training for Ukrainian and other Eastern European forces, NATO Partnership for Peace programs, and ensuing programs for NATO expansion (Ulrich 1999). The third and final piece included the Nunn-Lugar denuclearization program.

**Case study Finding and Conclusions:**

**Transactional and Participatory Leadership and Change -- Monitoring and Enforcement Processes**

Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms for institution building include aspects of intra and interstate as well as international relations. For instance, in the Nunn-Lugar case, early support was lacking from the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 80). On the U.S. side, new organizations were formed within existing Cold War agencies, such as the reorganization and new missions assigned in the transition from the U.S. Defense Nuclear Agency to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which included the newly chartered On-Site Inspection
Agency (OSIA), which was founded to support early post Cold War counterproliferation initiatives.\(^\text{19}\)

In comparison, the later failed North Korean framework relied on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for monitoring and enforcement. Later, in 2000, the last Cohen Defense Report points out the significance of the Agreed Framework freezing North Korean nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon under IAEA inspections (Cohen 2000, p. 11). The resulting collapse of the North Korean international monitoring and enforcement again provides a contrast to the effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms of the Nunn-Lugar programs with included host agencies, such as MINATOM and DTRA, engaged directly. In comparing these two cases, the evidence to date suggests the critical importance of host country involvement in actively supporting monitoring and enforcement arrangements.\(^\text{20}\)

The phrase “lengthening the shadow of the future” again portrays the important perception of institutional arrangements as enhancing the prospects of future benefits and costs. In other word, the potential for future payoffs lends support for institution building. Writing in 1999, Carter and Perry emphasize the successes of Nunn-Lugar in the early post Cold War period (pp 77-79). In addition, they project forward to highlight continuing counterproliferation work. In particular, they note that Russia still possesses enough plutonium and highly enriched uranium to produce between 25,000 and 80,000 nuclear weapons. Therefore, they propose reinventing Nunn-Lugar with expanding


\(^{20}\) For a comparison of difficulties in arms control inspection, monitoring and verification when the host country refuses to cooperate see recent firsthand accounts of the United Nations’ Special Commission for Iraq (U.N.SCOM) executive directors, Richard Butler (2000) and Hans Blix (2004).
program budgets with greater latitude for nuclear audits and inspections and a new arms control regime. The call is for an expansion of Nunn-Lugar for safeguarding fissile materials. The initiative in expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction Program proliferation regimes is echoed in recent work by the Carnegie Foundation and again by Allison of Harvard’s Belfer Center (Perkovich et al 2004, Allison 2004,).

Case study Finding and Conclusions:

Linking Visionary-Rhetorical, Transactional, and Participatory Leadership in Policy Innovation -- Facilitating Bargaining

The final dimension for assessing the instrumental relevance of international institutions concerns facilitating bargaining. Facilitation includes establishing rules, procedures, principles and precedents, as well as creating high costs for no agreement. The extensive nature of the eight components cited for successful negotiations reveals the importance of institutions and regimes, along with supporting organizations, for effective policymaking and implementation. The eight components drawn from the literature on bargaining and negotiations include: (1) rules; (2) information; (3) standards; (4) information about compliance; (5) credible penalties; (6) enforceable rules; (7) cooperation through information sharing; and (8) limiting the number of participants.

In the Nunn-Lugar case, making the CTR effective policy instruments required extensive negotiations for rules to stabilize expectations. Carter and Perry point out that managing expectations included more players than the engaged international negotiators. For instance, on the U.S. side there were expectations from the Congress to overcome their traditional, Cold-War security concerns. The new Russian Duma also had to be kept on board. Similarly, in the Agreed Framework negotiations, Ambassador Gallucci
highlights the critical nature of his negotiating team’s liaison with influential senators and congress members (Wit, Poneman, and Gallucci 2004).

The signaling of information is also cited as important by the Nunn-Lugar negotiators. Carter and Perry point out that it took an official Pentagon internal study, the 1994 “Nuclear Posture Review,” to clearly signal “a new phase of arms control “ that was fundamentally different for the Cold War balance of terror (Carter and Perry 1999, p. 85). The “Nuclear Posture Review” was meant as a clear signal to players domestically and internationally, that the Cold War was over and nuclear weapons would play a smaller role in U.S. defense planning. This new approach includes calls for dramatic cuts in the U.S. strategic arsenal and would drive down the total number of strategic weapons in ongoing iterations of strategic arms reduction talks.

Two other factors in the Nunn-Lugar bargaining do stand out. Traditional Cold War concerns about security and secrecy had to be overcome. Information about compliance arrangements was crucial for building trust and confidence for continuing the program. In this respect, Carter and Perry (p. 88) emphasize the significance of mutual information between the U.S. and Russia regarding the “technical implementation” of the de-alerting and de-targeting of strategic missiles. The complexity and high degree of transparency necessary insured that each side had to step up to new challenges for continuing to shape a new post-Cold War relationship.

In a similar manner, the activities required for the success of Operation Sapphire also contributed to lowering the barriers to gaining information about compliance, as well as increasing cooperation by increasing information flows. The cooperative advantages of information sharing led to a cascading effect for additional Nunn-Lugar program
initiatives. Sapphire was followed by the Russian dismantling of SS-18 intercontinental ballistic missiles. These security initiatives were then complemented by medical diagnostic programs for cancer tests in and around former Soviet nuclear facilities; by research grants for Russian, Kazakh, and Ukrainian scientists; and by defense industry conversions to commercial pursuits.

This case study focused on the study of the Clinton Administration’s Nunn-Lugar, Counterproliferation Policy Initiatives for reducing the threats of “loose nukes” in Russia and the Former Soviet Republics. The Russian case, as guided by institutional theory, examined U.S. and, in particular, the U.S. Defense Department’s leadership efforts in countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons of mass destruction, from 1992 to 2000. This case study findings suggest the significance and influence of institution and organization-building approaches, for effective counterproliferation policymaking. Certainly, developing a framework for synthesizing both competitive strategies versus an enemy regime, as in the North Korean case, and cooperative strategies for promoting a common counterproliferation policy and strategy, as in the Nunn-Lugar case, reveals important differences in terms of conditions and contexts for effective policymaking, institution building and organizational development. Russian relations remain a challenge. At the same time more study is needed of the organizational, or agency mechanisms for improving an institutional approach.
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Under the Nunn-Lugar program, the missiles deployed at Pervomaysk by the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and the silos that housed them were destroyed. As Carter recounted: [W]hen we first went there we helped with removing the warheads from the missiles. The Nunn-Lugar Amendment. Congress initiated U.S. threat reduction and nonproliferation assistance to the Soviet Union in November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Consequently, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar proposed an amendment to the implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228). It suggested that these new initiatives could include programs and projects in Asia and the Middle East; and activities relating to the denuclearization of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The collapse of the Soviet Union raised concerns about the fate of its nuclear weapons and led the United States to fund what came to be known as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). This includes programs that fight the proliferation of weapons expertise by providing...